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An International Law Response to
Economic Cyber Espionage
CHRISTINA PARAJON SKINNER
Cyber threats have emerged as one of the most serious dangers to U.S.
and global security. Increasingly, malicious actors—some private, but others
that appear to be state-sponsored—seek to advance their strategic aims
through violent or non-violent cyber-attacks. This Article considers the
problem of non-violent, yet still destructive, economic cyber espionage, which
targets the intellectual, industrial, and information property of major global
powers like the United States.
The Article argues that the international community’s reticence is owing
to a stale set of international legal norms. The Article explains how existing
principles of international law—such as state sovereignty, non-intervention,
and state responsibility—should evolve to address the current threat of
economic cyber espionage. The Article also discusses how norms against
economic cyber espionage could also be interpreted to exist within the World
Trade Organization (WTO) agreements that deal with intellectual property.
These WTO rules together with the relevant (and modernized) customary
norms arguably provide WTO member states recourse to the Dispute
Settlement Body to assert their claims of economic cyber espionage. The
Article urges victim states to channel their legal complaints through this
economic body and its dispute resolution mechanism. It concludes with a
realist perspective on why the WTO would be the most effective institution to
ensure compliance with these norms.
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An International Law Response to
Economic Cyber Espionage
CHRISTINA PARAJON SKINNER*
I. INTRODUCTION
Spying has re-emerged as a significant problem for national security.
Today, in the Internet and information age, states have re-tooled their
espionage techniques for use in cyberspace—and the United States is a
prime target.1 For the past several years, cyber espionage has been
adversely impacting the nation’s economic and national security.2 Covert
cyberintrusions, which target U.S. industry, research, and technology, are
undermining the economy and its global competitiveness. But despite the
damage that this spying has caused so far, these covert attacks continue,
with no wholly effective legal or policy solution to date.
Cyber espionage, and economic-oriented cyber espionage in particular,
poses a serious threat to the United States’ national security. This type of
economic espionage “affects the sources of American power,”3 including
its comparative advantage in scientific and technological innovation and
development. According to a report from the Office of the National
Counterintelligence Executive, cyberspace, “where most business activity
and development of new ideas now takes place,” allows “malicious”
cyberspies “to quickly steal and transfer massive quantities of data while

*

J.D. Yale Law School, 2010; A.B. Princeton University, 2006. Thank you to William Skinner,
who helped me to develop this idea, and to Michael Reisman, BJ Ard, Pamela Foohey, Charlotte
Garden, and Joshua Geltzer for their comments. I am also grateful to the editors of the Connecticut
Law Review for their careful editing of this Article.
1
See, e.g., David E. Sanger & Mark Landler, U.S. and China Will Hold Talks About Hacking,
N.Y. TIMES, June 2, 2013, at A1 (remarking that the growth of cyber-attacks is “a new enough
phenomenon”).
2
In the context of a case involving an illegal export of U.S. military software, one federal agent
recently explained that “[w]hile the thefts associated with economic espionage and illegal technology
transfers may not capture the same level of attention as a terrorist incident, the costs to the U.S.
economy and our national security are substantial.” Press Release: United Technologies Subsidiary
Pleads
Guilty
to
Criminal
Charges
for
Helping
China
Develop
New
Attack Helicopter, U.S. DEP’T JUST. (June 28, 2012), http://www.justice.gov/usao/ct/Press2012/201206
28.html.
3
JAMES A. LEWIS, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT’L STUDIES, CONFLICT AND NEGOTIATION IN
CYBERSPACE 50 (2013), available at http://csis.org/files/publication/130208_Lewis_ConflictCyberspac
e_Web.pdf; see also id. (noting that “[t]rade is a national security issue”).
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4

remaining anonymous and hard to detect.” The report also warned that
“[c]yber tools have enhanced the economic espionage threat, and the
Intelligence Community . . . judges the use of such tools is already a larger
threat than more traditional espionage methods.”5 As commentators have
noted, “[T]he hemorrhage of intellectual property (IP)—our most
important international competitive advantage—is a national crisis. Nearly
every U.S. business sector—advanced materials, electronics,
pharmaceuticals and biotech, chemicals, aerospace, heavy equipment,
autos, home products, software and defense systems—has experienced
massive theft and illegal reproduction.”6 It comes as no surprise, then, that
the 2010 National Security Strategy assessed “[c]ybersecurity threats
represent one of the most serious national security, public safety, and
economic challenges we face as a nation.”7
Though there are no doubt other actors who have resorted to economic
cyber espionage, Chinese actors appear to be at least one significant source
of this activity.8 In the past few years, China has reportedly attacked many
4

OFFICE OF THE NAT’L COUNTERINTELLIGENCE EXEC., FOREIGN SPIES STEALING U.S.
ECONOMIC SECRETS IN CYBERSPACE: REPORT TO CONGRESS ON FOREIGN ECONOMIC COLLECTION
AND INDUSTRIAL ESPIONAGE, 2009–2011, at i (2011) [hereinafter FOREIGN SPIES STEALING U.S.
ECONOMIC SECRETS].
5
Id.
6
Dennis Blair & John Huntsman, Jr., Safeguard U.S. Ingenuity, WASH. POST, May 22, 2013, at
A19. Private industry and government are not the only sectors affected; academia has also been the
victim of serious cyberintrusions. According to the New York Times, “America’s research
universities . . . are increasingly coming under cyberattack, most of it thought to be from China, with
millions of hacking attempts weekly. Campuses are being forced to tighten security, constrict their
culture of openness and try to determine what has been stolen.” Richard Pérez-Peña, Campuses Face
Rising Threat from Hackers, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 2013, at A1. The target, however, remains the same:
intellectual property.
Universities and their professors are awarded thousands of patents each year, some
with vast potential value, in fields as disparate as prescription drugs, computer chips,
fuel cells, aircraft and medical devices. . . . Like major corporations, universities
develop intellectual property that can turn into valuable products like prescription
drugs or computer chips. But university systems are harder to secure, with
thousands of students and staff members logging in with their own computers.
Id.
7

THE WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY 27 (2010), cited in THE TALLINN MANUAL
LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER WARFARE 2 (Michael N. Schmitt ed., 2013)
[hereinafter TALLINN MANUAL].
8
The evidence that China sponsors cyber espionage includes detailed reports by the cybersecurity
firm Mandiant. One report published in 2013 indicates that:
ON THE INTERNATIONAL

APT1 [an advanced threat actor called “Advanced Persistent Threat”] has been
stealing hundreds of terabytes of data from at least 141 organizations across a
diverse set of industries beginning as early as 2006. . . . Once the group establishes
access to a victim’s network, they continue to access it periodically over several
months or years to steal large volumes of valuable intellectual property, including
technological blueprints, proprietary manufacturing processes, test results, business
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sectors of the U.S. economy and agencies critical to our national security,
penetrating the online systems of the U.S. Departments of Homeland
Security and State, Coca-Cola, Lockheed Martin, Dow Chemical, Adobe,
Yahoo!, and Google, to name just a few.9 According to General Keith B.
Alexander, head of the United States Cyber Command and director of the
National Security Agency, these cyber “attacks have resulted in the
‘greatest transfer of wealth in history.’”10
The U.S. government has officially accused China of e-spying on
American interests.11 A Pentagon report released in May 2013 found that
China’s cyber espionage targeted industrial technology, as well as
government policy information.12 In February 2014, the New York Times
reported, “Obama administration officials say they are planning to tell
China’s new leaders . . . that the volume and sophistication of the attacks
have become so intense that they threaten the fundamental relationship
between Washington and Beijing.”13 And on May 19, 2014, the U.S.
Department of Justice announced that it was indicting five members of the
plans, pricing documents, partnership agreements, emails and contact lists from
victim organizations’ leadership.
MANDIANT, APT1: EXPOSING ONE OF CHINA’S CYBER ESPIONAGE UNITS 20 (2013) [hereinafter
MANDIANT REPORT], available at http://intelreport.mandiant.com/Mandiant_APT1_Report.pdf. It
concludes “that APT1 is likely government sponsored.” Id. at 2. More recently, Mandiant has inferred
from the intelligence it has collected that “A.P.T. 1 is Unit 61398” of the Chinese Army, “the central
element of Chinese computer espionage.” David E. Sanger et al., China’s Army Seen as Tied to
Hacking Against U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 2014, at A1. It is from the location of this Unit that “an
overwhelming percentage of the attacks on American corporations, organizations and government
agencies” is believed to originate. Id. There are many other published accounts of China’s
participation in cyber espionage. See, e.g., FOREIGN SPIES STEALING U.S. ECONOMIC SECRETS, supra
note 4, at i (“Chinese actors are the world’s most active and persistent perpetrators of economic
espionage.”); Michael Riley, Snowden’s Leaks Cloud U.S. Plan to Curb Chinese Hacking,
BLOOMBERG (June 30, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-07-01/snowden-s-leaks-cloud-us-plan-to-curb-chinese-hacking.html (“The U.S. already has privately provided China’s leaders with
evidence it gathered linking the hacks of commercial companies to China’s intelligence
agencies . . . .”); sources cited infra notes 9–12. However, this Article does not assume that China is
the only country capable of or culpable for committing economic cyber espionage. Other countries
reportedly engage in cyber espionage as well. See, e.g., LEWIS, supra note 3, at 44–45 (describing
Russia’s cyber espionage efforts and noting that Israel and France have also been accused of
maintaining state-led cyber espionage programs).
9
Phillip Elmer-DeWitt, Apple. China. Cyberwar., CNNMONEY (Mar. 31, 2013),
http://tech.fortune.cnn.com/2013/03/31/apple-china-hackers-tradewar.
10
Sanger & Landler, supra note 1.
11
David E. Sanger, China’s Military Is Accused by U.S. in Cyberattacks, N.Y. TIMES, May 7,
2013, at A1.
12
Id. Although this Article is principally concerned with private sector thefts, according to the
Pentagon report, “China is using its computer network exploitation capability to support intelligence
collection against the U.S. diplomatic, economic, and defense industrial base sectors that support U.S.
national defense programs.” Gopal Ratnam, Pentagon Accuses China of Cyberspying on U.S.
Government, BLOOMBERG (May 7, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-05-06/china-smilitary-ambitions-growing-pentagon-report-finds.html.
13
Sanger et al., supra note 8.
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People’s Liberation Army of China for the alleged economic cyber
espionage activities of Unit 61398.14 Surely, the United States has by now
recognized that some meaningful action should be taken to address this
problem.15 For many years, however, these “[Chinese] intrusions . . .
provoked little American response.”16 But economic cyber espionage is no
longer on the back burner. While administration officials once felt that
“the theft of intellectual property was an annoyance, resulting in the loss of
billions of dollars of revenue,” their recent actions indicate “something has
changed.”17
Yet economic cyber espionage is not only a domestic concern. Just as
it harms the United States’ economy, economic cyber espionage also
threatens international trade and, over time, stands to have a destabilizing
impact on the global economic order. For this reason, as a top Obama
Administration official has stated, “the international community cannot
tolerate such activity from any country.”18 The international community
has not, however, formulated a coherent response. Although various
factors could be blamed for this tepid response, the lack of clearly
established law regarding economic cyber espionage or institutionalized
mechanisms for regulating this activity very likely impedes further
14
David E. Sanger, With Spy Charges, U.S. Draws a Line that Few Others Recognize, N.Y.
TIMES, May 20, 2014, at A8.
15
Others have recognized the need for firm policy action: “[T]he federal government must
establish policies that firmly signal a commitment to protect American businesses and warn hostile
actors that they cannot inflict critical damage on the U.S. economy without consequence.” Evan F.
Kohlmann & Rodrigo Bijou, Planning Responses and Defining Attacks in Cyberspace, 126 HARV. L.
REV. F. 173, 174 (2013). As U.S. Representative Mike Rogers underscored to the House Committee on
Intelligence:

China’s economic espionage has reached an intolerable level and I believe that the
United States and our allies in Europe and Asia have an obligation to confront
Beijing and demand that they put a stop to this piracy.
Beijing is waging a massive trade war on us all, and we should band together to
pressure them to stop. Combined, the United States and our allies in Europe and
Asia have significant diplomatic and economic leverage over China, and we should
use this to our advantage to put an end to this scourge.
MANDIANT REPORT, supra note 8, at 1 (quoting Cyber Threats and Ongoing Efforts to Protect the
Nation: Hearing Before the H. Permanent Select Comm. on Intelligence, 112th Cong. (2011)
(statement of Rep. Mike Rogers, Chairman, H. Permanent Select Comm. on Intelligence)).
16
David Feith, The Weekend Interview with Timothy L. Thomas: Why China Is Reading Your
Email, WALL ST. J., Mar. 30, 2013, at A11.
17
Sanger et al., supra note 8. This New York Times article also notes the “mounting evidence of
state sponsorship” and the fact that “[t]he United States government is planning to begin a more
aggressive defense against Chinese hacking groups.” Id. Until now, it seemed as though most
attention had been focused on the threat of a large-scale kinetic cyberattack. In actuality, others have
argued that “[t]he most severe threats lie in attacks against critical infrastructure” and the theft of
valuable economic and strategic intellectual property or systems. Kohlmann & Bijou, supra note 15, at
173.
18
Feith, supra note 16.
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action.
This anormativity and lack of institutional arrangements for
enforcing norms on the international level has created a moral hazard and
legal vacuum. In this landscape, economic cyber espionage is arguably
perceived by some states, like China and others that are similarly
motivated, as a rational strategy for advancing an upward economic
trajectory.
This Article urges the international community to respond to the
normative and institutional gap in the law in order to treat the problem of
economic cyber espionage. In so doing, the Article explains how certain
norms of public international law can be said to apply to cyber espionage
and should be incorporated into the existing treaty-based framework of the
World Trade Organization (WTO). The Article also explains why pressing
claims in the WTO would be effective against perpetrators of economic
cyber espionage. Namely, this approach would both solidify customary
norms against economic cyber espionage and leverage a credible source of
authority to curb cyber-violations. To advance this thesis, the Article
proceeds in three Parts.
Part II considers the problem of economic cyber espionage through the
lens of China’s conduct, using the country as a case study. It explores the
connection between China’s rise to superpower status and its acts of cyber
espionage in the United States. Specifically, Part II discusses China’s
pressure to expand economically and its dependence on continued
integration within the world economic order, including through
membership in key multilateral economic institutions like the WTO.
Part II suggests that states with these types of strategic motives may be
more prone to succumb to the moral and institutional ambiguity
surrounding economic cyber espionage.
Part III addresses the anormativity surrounding economic cyber
espionage. It argues that economic cyber espionage violates wellestablished norms of customary international law, such as sovereignty,
non-intervention, and state responsibility. It discusses how the existing
principle of state sovereignty also provides a derivative right to economic
sovereignty, which is directly violated by economic cyber espionage.
Moreover, to the extent states sponsor the economic cyber-intervention of
non-state actors—i.e., cyberspies—those states can be held accountable
under the doctrines of state responsibility or non-intervention. In short,
Part III argues that economic cyber espionage is illegal under customary
principles of international law, even if traditional espionage is not.
19

See Kohlmann & Bijou, supra note 15, at 173 (“A lack of established international legal
procedures, a hazy public understanding of the mechanics of electronic intrusions, and cyberterrorists’
exponentially faster operational tempo (all combined with the extreme challenges involved in
definitively identifying perpetrators on the Internet) have allowed some lawless actors to operate with a
surprising sense of impunity.”).
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Part IV suggests an institutional mechanism for enforcing these rights
through the WTO. It first points out that the customary norm of economic
sovereignty, as an aspect of the lex generalis, applies in conjunction with
existing treaty-based rights under the WTO agreements, which is a lex
specialis. By interpreting the WTO treaty rules in the context of the lex
generalis of economic sovereignty and non-economic intervention,
member states may arguably assert a claim under the WTO’s Dispute
Settlement Understanding (“DSU”) against any member state that engages
in or sponsors economic cyber espionage. On that basis, Part IV urges the
United States to assert a claim in the WTO against member states that
violate its economic sovereignty through economic cyber espionage. In
the specific case of China, Part IV argues that the WTO—as the anchor of
the international economic order and thus a necessary role-player in
China’s plan to obtain superpower status—has the ability to ensure
Chinese compliance. And given the procedures of the WTO dispute
resolution mechanism, China would be likely to engage cooperatively with
the process, avoiding unnecessary confrontation between the United States
and China or a deterioration in U.S.-Sino relations.
II. UNDERSTANDING THE THREAT: WHY STATES ENGAGE IN
ECONOMIC CYBER ESPIONAGE
This Article begins by considering, from a political and international
relations perspective,20 the possible strategic motivations that drive states
to engage in economic cyber espionage. In deconstructing the particular
case of China, Part II suggests that economic cyber espionage may be
state-driven and not purely private conduct, bringing it within the bounds
of public international law. Moreover, it demonstrates that the motivation
to engage in economic cyber espionage is two-fold: to achieve economic
expansion and avoid global alienation. In this circumstance, the rules of
law and dispute settlement mechanisms of a multilateral economic
institution, like the WTO, would be effective in persuading such a state to
abandon this activity. Part II concludes that other states with similar
motives are also likely to take advantage of the normative and institutional
vacuum that exists in the international law on economic cyber espionage.
A. Power Transition in the Twenty-First Century World Order
International relations scholars have studied the impact of states’
efforts to advance their status in the global order. Power transition theory
presents one particular approach to analyzing shifts in the global order that
20
As President Barack Obama has noted, in many ways, the “old architecture” of international
law is “buckling under the weight of new threats.” Remarks on Accepting the Nobel Peace Prize in
Oslo, Norway, 2009 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 985, at 2 (Dec. 10, 2009).
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accompany transitions of power between states. According to the basic
tenets of the theory, which was first developed by A.F.K. Organzski and
later refined by Robert Gilpin, war is the likely consequence of power
transitions in which the challenging state is both dissatisfied with its
position and has or is near to parity with the dominant state.22 War,
however, is not an inevitable outcome of a power transition.23 In fact, the
post-World War II global order, largely built on multilateral institution and
alliance, is conducive to peaceful power transitions, including China’s rise
to superpower status. By design, states transitioning to power in the
contemporary world order require the support of these various legal
institutions. In theory, then, would-be superpowers should want to be
careful to avoid a disruption in their relationships with these institutions.
1. The Factors that Influence China’s Rise
China faces intense pressure to expand economically. Theories that
explain why states seek to expand territorially provide some insight into
why aspiring superpower states, like China, seek to expand in the
economic space.24 For instance, according to the theory of “lateral
pressure,” developed by Nazli Choueri and Robert North, “States
experiencing high rates of population growth and technological change
require increasing stocks of resources to fuel further economic
development. Over time, states find that they lack resources within their
boundaries and thus face mounting ‘lateral pressure’ to expand abroad.”25
Although this theory has been applied in the context of physical
resources,26 economic expansion today also requires technology and
intellectual property.27 Consistent with this theory, as China’s growth
outstrips its technological resources, it may seek out these resources
abroad.28
21
Jack S. Levy, Power Transition Theory and the Rise of China, in CHINA’S ASCENT: POWER
SECURITY AND THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 11, 12 (Robert S. Ross & Zhu Feng eds.,
2008) [hereinafter CHINA’S ASCENT].
22
Id. at 12–14.
23
See M. Taylor Fravel, International Relations Theory and China’s Rise: Assessing China’s
Potential for Territorial Expansion, 12 INT’L STUDS. REV. 505, 506 (2010) (“[S]cholars . . . note that
some transitions have been peaceful, such as the one between the United States and the United
Kingdom in the late nineteenth century.”).
24
See id. at 513 (“China today appears to fit the criteria of an ‘alpha’ state prone to lateral
pressure . . . . As China’s economy has developed rapidly over the past two decades . . . its need for
resources has grown dramatically.”).
25
Id.
26
See id. (discussing China’s need for various “products and commodities . . . such as petroleum
or arable land”).
27
See Sanger & Landler, supra note 1 (“Chinese academics and industrialists say that if China is
to maintain its annual economic growth . . . it needs a steady inflow of new technology.”).
28
See Fravel, supra note 23, at 513 (explaining that, under the theory of lateral pressure, states
often “believe that . . . [resources] need to be captured or controlled through conquest”).
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China also faces internal pressure to expand economically. Its desire
to be a “rich and strong country” is centuries old,29 but has intensified
during the last few decades.30 Chinese leaders apparently maintain that the
time is ripe for China to advance technologically and grow its economy.31
These messages have cultivated an economically-oriented national
mentality.32
A national expectation of growth and technological advancement has a
powerful effect on Chinese foreign policy and strategy. International
relations theory recognizes that “collective ideas . . . ‘matter’ in [shaping]
foreign policy.”33 As one scholar explained, Chinese foreign policy is, in
part, a function of the “expectations it generates in the domestic arena and
the results that are experienced.”34
Thus, meeting the economic
expectations they have created is a priority for Chinese leaders.35 As such,
China’s aim to rise within the global order is arguably a means to an end of
national economic development.
2. China Depends on Integration Within the International Economic
Order
China’s ability to expand economically depends on its integration
within the world economic order.36 As one China specialist has explained:
China has benefitted tremendously from its participation in
the existing international economic order. Indeed, China has
risen precisely by deepening its engagement with existing
institutions, not challenging them.
To date, China’s
economic development has occurred through the relative
openness of its economy to trade and foreign investment. In
return, China has become increasingly dependent on such
29

Jeffrey W. Legro, What China Will Want: The Future Intentions of a Rising Power, 5 PERSP.
515, 517 (2007); see also Fravel, supra note 23, at 518–23 (discussing domestic pressures for
expansion, which include nationalism).
30
In 1997, Jiang Zemin reportedly reminded China that it “seeks ‘the goal of being prosperous
and strong’—an aim shared by Chinese leaders . . . throughout the ages.” Legro, supra note 29, at 517
(quoting Jiang Zemin’s Report at the 15th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, FED’N
AM. SCIENTISTS, http://www.fas.org/news/china/1997/970912-prc.htm (last visited Apr. 15, 2014)).
31
FOREIGN SPIES STEALING U.S. ECONOMIC SECRETS, supra note 4, at 5.
32
See Legro, supra note 29, at 525 (noting that China’s leaders justify integration into the
international order based on “economic development” and “bettering the living standards of Chinese
citizens”).
33
Id. at 522.
34
Id. at 524.
35
See id. at 525 (“[T]he legitimacy and popular support of the government does not rest on
socialist ideology, but instead on economic performance. ‘Well-off Society’ not ‘Workers Unite’ is the
national mantra.”).
36
See id. (“The first, and most important, justification of [China’s] current policy is that
integration within the existing national order provides the best means for national economic
development.”).
ON POL.
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China has thus sought to avoid instigating the creation of anti-China
coalitions, which could threaten its “continued economic development”
and ostracize it from the global economic community.38
For these reasons, China’s relationship with the United States is
strategically delicate. Although the world is becoming increasingly
multipolar, the United States may still occupy the role of hegemon.39 This
power dynamic has made it difficult for China to balance the United
States,40 and China has chosen instead to “bandwagon” or cooperate with
the United States.41 Although internally China may desire to resist
perceived U.S. dominance,42 an outwardly aggressive policy would
disserve its ultimate aim, as the United States has been a proponent of
China’s assimilation into the economic order that has supported its rise.43
As the next Section argues, if China feels pressure to appear peaceful while
at the same time amassing the resources it needs to propel itself toward
superpower status,44 economic cyber espionage may seem like the ideal
strategy.

37

Fravel, supra note 23, at 511 (citation omitted).
Id. at 510.
39
See Matthew Happold, Introduction to INTERNATIONAL LAW IN A MULTIPOLAR WORLD 1, 2
(Matthew Happold ed., 2012) (“[T]he international system appears to be experiencing a tendency
toward multipolarity . . . .”); Zhu Feng, China’s Rise Will Be Peaceful, in CHINA’S ASCENT, supra note
21, at 34, 36–37 (discussing U.S. hegemony dynamics in the face of a “rising China”).
40
Id. at 37. Just as China cannot internally balance U.S. power, it cannot persuade any partners to
try to do so with it. See id. at 42–43 (noting that an attempt to balance would be “ineffective” and as a
result there is “little incentive . . . to attempt to weaken U.S. power” through external measures and
coalitions like “reordering either the global or regional alignments”).
41
Id. at 43, 44.
42
Id. at 39. Resistance to U.S. power has become a matter of national pride as “Chinese blogs are
full of national rhetoric accusing the United States of seeking to keep China bowed and humbled.”
Zachary Karabell, Do American Politicians Even Care About the Rise of China Anymore?, ATLANTIC,
(June 7, 2013), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2013/06/do-american-politicians-even-careabout-the-rise-of-china-anymore/276663.
43
See Tom Johnson, Clinton Pushes Open Trade, CNNMONEY (Jan. 29, 2000),
http://money.cnn.com/2000/01/29/economy/davos_clinton/ (describing how President Clinton
supported China’s entry to the WTO); Phillip C. Saunders, The U.S. Isn’t Trying to Contain China,
FOREIGN POL’Y (Aug. 23, 2013), www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/08/23/the_united_states_is_not
_trying_to_contain_china (arguing that the U.S. is “working to expand China’s role in international
organizations and increase U.S. access to China’s market,” rather than trying to contain China, and
noting that trade between the United States and China increased during the first half of 2013 and
reached $244 billion). As Ashley Tellis argues, from the U.S. perspective, a policy of economic
containment could not be successful now in light of China’s integration in the world economic order.
ASHLEY J. TELLIS, BALANCING WITHOUT CONTAINMENT: AN AMERICAN STRATEGY FOR MANAGING
CHINA 8–9 (2014); see id. at 19 (noting that “the American polity has not yet responded to the growth
of Chinese power with the seriousness and urgency that it displayed . . . in regard to the Soviet threat”).
44
See Fravel, supra note 23, at 511 (“In the early 2000s, Chinese political elites began to frame
China’s foreign policy around the concept of ‘peaceful rise.’”).
38
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B. China’s Grand Strategy for Rising
These strategic considerations may explain why a state like China is
not necessarily interested in expanding its power by physical force or other
overtly antagonistic strategies.45 As Gao Cheng argues, for some rising
powers there appears to be a “deeper economic logic” behind the drive to
expand.46 This Section considers why economic espionage may appear to
be a logical or rational strategy to Chinese decision-makers.
1. China’s Peaceful Rise
An economic expansionist rising in the twenty-first century, such as
China, is unlikely to aggress against the international economic
community.47 In China’s case, its leaders no doubt recognize that a
“confrontational and aggressive foreign policy” would harm China’s
economic development.48 Aggressive foreign policies would “damage . . .
decades of economic reforms in terms of lost trade, foreign investment,
and technology, and, more generally, its participation in an international
order that has facilitated greatly its rise.”49 China is therefore expected to
pursue a strategy of “reassurance” vis-à-vis the international community.50
Likely for these reasons, in the early twenty-first century Chinese
political elites began to characterize China’s foreign policy “around the
concept of ‘peaceful rise.’”51 The image of the peaceful riser was
“strategic, designed to convey a benign and non-threatening image to other
states, reassuring them about China’s growing capabilities.”52 And China
has taken various steps to solidify its image as a peaceful riser. For
example, it has abided by Confucian values, endeavored to “conjure up a
collective historical memory across East Asia,” and spread Chinese
45
See Gao Cheng, Market Expansion and Grand Strategy of Rising Powers, 4 CHINESE J. INT’L
POL. 405, 412 (2011) (explaining that “the specific means through which [rising powers] choose to
expand . . . depend primarily on a cost-benefit analysis” and that “using force to change the status quo
is not necessarily the path that a rising power will follow”).
46
Id. at 411. Cheng argues, “[A]s a state rises in the industrial era . . . the basic goal of its grand
strategy is to achieve economic development.” Id. Cheng departs from traditional power transition
theory (among others) and asserts that such arguments “fail to consider the strategy guiding China’s
rise as a choice based on industrial needs.” Id. at 444. He contends that “[t]he strategies great powers
follow in rising accord with an economic principle.” Id.
47
See Feng, supra note 39, at 36 (“Many scholars stress that China’s extensive participation in
globalization and normative economic diplomacy may mitigate its revisionist objectives and may
socialize it into the existing order.”); see also Fravel, supra note 23, at 506 (suggesting the utility of
conducting a cost-benefit analysis to assess whether China’s rise will be aggressive).
48
Fravel, supra note 23, at 511.
49
Id. at 506.
50
See id. at 510 (arguing that China will pursue a grand strategy of “reassurance, which is keyed
to participation in the existing international order and preventing the formation of a counter-balancing
coalition that could block or limit China’s continued economic development”).
51
Id. at 511.
52
Id.
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academic thinking on a more global scale.
Yet China, which has been growing at a rapid pace in the past several
decades,54 naturally requires resources to sustain that growth. The inputs
needed to fuel an expanding economy today are not only physical but also,
importantly, technological and innovative.55 Like other great powers
before it, China is likely focused on “obtaining the necessary factors of
production, resources, and markets” to propel its rise to superpower
status.56
These economic pressures and constraints leave a state such as China
in a difficult strategic situation. On the one hand, it must avoid outward
displays of antagonism toward the international economic order. On the
other, to maintain its progression to superpower status, it must continue to
push its economy to the next level, feeding this expansion with what it
perceives to be the necessary technological and scientific resource inputs.
2. A Grand Strategy of Cyber Espionage
A grand strategy of economic cyber espionage could, in theory, serve
China’s aim of maintaining a peaceful image while expanding
economically at a rapid pace—particularly when targeted against the
United States or another superpower that has made significant
technological and innovative advancements.57 The U.S. private sector, as a
leader in technological development and a “central player in global
financial and trade networks,” is an especially attractive target for
economic cyber espionage by a state that is eager to make rapid gains in its
own technological and economic fields.58 For an aspiring economic
superpower, it may well seem that “economic espionage [is] an essential
tool in achieving national security and economic prosperity,” and China
may continue to be one of the most “aggressive and capable collectors of
sensitive US economic information and technologies . . . in cyberspace.”59
53
Gordon C.K. Cheung, International Relations Theory in Flux in View of China’s “Peaceful
Rise,” 26 COPENHAGEN J. ASIAN STUDS. 5, 12–13 (2008); see id. at 12–17 (describing China’s use of
soft power).
54
See ZULIU HU & MOHSIN S. KHAN, INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND ECONOMIC ISSUES
REPORT 8: WHY IS CHINA GROWING SO FAST? 1 (1997) (noting that since 1978 China has grown at
more than nine percent per annum, with an almost four hundred percent rise in per capita income).
55
See supra notes 25–28 and accompanying text; see also Levy, supra note 21, at 18–19
(suggesting that some predictions made under power transition theory may not sufficiently or precisely
account for the impact of innovation).
56
Cheng, supra note 45, at 412.
57
See Sanger & Landler, supra note 1 (“Chinese academics and industrialists say that if China is
to maintain its annual economic growth rate of 7 or 8 percent, it needs a steady inflow of new
technology. That could make the Chinese reluctant to cut back on the systematic theft of intellectual
property.”).
58
FOREIGN SPIES STEALING U.S. ECONOMIC SECRETS, supra note 4, at i.
59
Id. at ii, 4.
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Cyber espionage also has the advantage of offering plausible
deniability. To be sure, China has rigorously denied accusations of
economic cyber espionage, calling it “unprofessional and groundless to
accuse the Chinese military of launching cyberattacks without any
conclusive evidence.”60 China’s Defense Ministry maintains that “[t]he
Chinese military has never supported any hack attacks” and suggests that
the cyberattacks have been perpetrated by transnational actors with
“anonymous characteristics.”61 On balance, a program of economic cyber
espionage may seem, from the perspective of a state like China, to have
several benefits and few drawbacks. Cyber espionage fuels technological
growth while, at the same time, “soft balancing” the United States.62
Moreover, due to its covert nature, China may preserve its image as a
peaceful riser and represent to the United States that it is not responsible
for these intrusions. And ultimately there is, as of yet, no tangible legal
repercussion.
Yet a firmer response from the international community, grounded in
principles of international law, may alter this perspective and reduce the
appeal of economic cyber espionage.63 As the next two Parts will show, a
legal response is not only appropriate and potentially effective, but it also
sends a broader message that is conducive to global stability: in the twentyfirst century, superpowers may rise in the global order provided they do so
within the rule of law. To that end, Part III argues that certain norms of
public international law already provide a basis for asserting this conduct
as unlawful.
60

Craig Timberg & Ellen Nakashima, Chinese Suspected in Attack on Post’s Computers, WASH.
POST., Feb. 2, 2013, at A1; see also Sanger, supra note 11 (quoting Hua Chunying, a spokeswoman for
the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as saying “China . . . resolutely oppose[s] all forms of hacker
attacks”).
61
Timberg & Nakashima, supra note 60. The Chinese have continued to deny these allegations
in the face of a U.S. criminal indictment charging economic cyber espionage and theft of trade secrets.
E.g., Timothy M. Phelps & Julie Makinen, U.S.-China Cyber Battle Grows; Five Chinese Military
Officials Are Accused of Stealing U.S. Corporate Secrets. Beijing Calls Charges “Fabricated.”, L.A.
TIMES, May 19, 2014, at A1.
62
See Feng, supra note 39, at 50 (describing soft balancing as engaging in “measures [that] do not
directly challenge a unipolar state’s military preponderance, but rather seek to delay, complicate, or
increase the costs of that state’s exercise of its power”).
63
Others believe that the rules of law on warfare justify a counter-attack in certain cyber-attack
situations. See, e.g., Michael N. Schmitt, Cyberspace and International Law: The Penumbral Mist of
Uncertainty, 126 HARV. L. REV. F. 176, 177 (2013) (“At a certain level of severity, cyberoperations
cross the ‘armed attack’ threshold, thereby allowing states to defend themselves with force, including
cyberforce, pursuant to Article 51 of the U.N. Charter and customary international law. The concept of
armed attacks at least includes cyberoperations causing death, injury, or significant damage.”); see also
Jan E. Messerschmidt, Note, Hackback: Permitting Retaliatory Hacking by Non-State Actors as
Proportionate Countermeasures to Transboundary Cyberharm, 52 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 275, 279
(2013) (“[S]tates have an obligation of due diligence to prevent significant transboundary cyberharm to
another state’s intellectual property. . . . [A]ffected states may be entitled to reciprocate by . . . allowing
their victimized nationals to hackback.” (emphasis added)).

2014]

AN INTERNATIONAL LAW RESPONSE TO ECONOMIC CYBER ESPIONAGE

1179

III. CUSTOMARY NORMS AND ECONOMIC CYBER ESPIONAGE
This Part argues that the international community should recognize
economic cyber espionage as prohibited under established principles of
customary international law. Section A first explains why economic cyber
espionage may seem to fall within a gap in the law. Though prosecutable
as a domestic crime, China’s state-sponsored cyberactions may be
effectively outside the United States’ reach, even if personal jurisdiction
could be said to apply.64
More importantly, this conduct seems
untouchable by international law. Historically, espionage has existed in
the hinterlands—neither expressly condoned nor condemned. Yet with the
capacity to cripple states’ economies and de-stabilize the global economic
order at a rapid and uncontrollable pace, economic cyber espionage should
be treated differently.
Section B next argues in favor of a modernized interpretation of
existing principles of international law. Specifically, it considers how
existing norms—first recognized decades ago—should be interpreted today
to fit the contemporary threat of economic cyber espionage. Although
existing norms of state sovereignty and non-intervention have customarily
been applied to safeguard the territorial integrity of states, today serious
threats to security are mounted from cyberspace. These invasions are
aimed to alter states’ economic powers and relationships, not their borders.
Accordingly, Section B argues that the principles of state sovereignty and
non-intervention, which provide derivative rights to economic sovereignty
and non-economic intervention, also prohibit economic cyber espionage.
By extension, states may be held accountable for violating these principles
either directly or through their sponsorship of these cyber actions.
A. The Espionage Lacuna in the Law
This Section explains the various bodies of domestic and international
law that could regulate economic cyber espionage but, for various reasons,
cannot effectively do so or simply do not yet recognize this conduct as
illegal. The result is a perceived lacuna in the law surrounding economic
cyber espionage. Subsection 1 discusses this lacuna and Subsection 2
explains why it is an illusion and why existing international law norms
could, in fact, fill this space.
1. U.S. Domestic Law and Economic Cyber Espionage
The covert theft of U.S. intellectual property and industrial secrets is
well covered by domestic criminal law. For one, the Economic Espionage
64
For a discussion of the extraterritorial application of the criminal law, see Sara A. Solow,
Prosecuting Terrorists as Criminals and the Limits of Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, 85 ST. JOHN’S L.
REV. 1483, 1508–16 (2011).
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Act of 1996 directly criminalizes this behavior. The statute provides that
economic espionage occurs when an actor knowingly or intentionally
commits an offense that “will benefit any foreign government, foreign
instrumentality, or foreign agent,” and “knowingly”: (1) steals or obtains a
trade secret by “fraud, artifice, or deception” or by other unauthorized
means; (2) “conveys a trade secret” by various methods of copying
(without authorization); or (3) “receives, buys, or possesses a trade secret
knowing” it was stolen or otherwise taken without authorization.66 Given
the breadth of this statute, it is surely intended to capture economic
espionage that is perpetrated in cyberspace and with cybertools.67 In fact,
the United States has recently used this statute to charge five Chinese
military hackers for acts of economic cyber espionage, among other
crimes, against U.S. companies.68
In reality, however, a U.S. prosecution for economic cyber espionage
likely does not loom large for foreign actors such as these.69 It has been
noted that “[e]spionage is nothing but the violation of someone else’s
laws.”70 Thus, for U.S. law to serve as a meaningful deterrent to foreign
actors, the United States must be able to apprehend and punish these actors
within the four corners of its domestic law. Yet, as a practical matter,
cyberspies can indefinitely evade prosecution if their host state refuses to
cooperate. In the case of China, for example, under the terms of the U.S.Hong Kong Extradition Treaty, China can refuse to extradite a person
within its borders if “surrender implicates the ‘defense, foreign affairs or
essential public interest or policy’ of the People’s Republic of China.”71
Thus the efficacy of the United States’ criminal action will depend on
65

18 U.S.C. §§ 1831–39 (2012).
Id. § 1831.
67
Of the seven cases brought under the Economic Espionage Act in 2010, six related to China.
COMM’N ON THE THEFT OF AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP., THE IP COMMISSION REPORT 42 (2013).
68
Indictment, United States v. Wang Dong, No. 14-118 (W.D. Pa. May 1, 2014), available at
http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/5122014519132358461949.pdf.
69
See COMM’N ON THE THEFT OF AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP., supra note 67, at 41 (observing that
it is “notoriously difficult” to curb trade-secret theft and economic espionage under the current U.S.
legal framework—with the latter offense being particularly problematic to prove because it “requires
that the act be done with intent to benefit a foreign nation”); id. at 42 (noting that the extraterritorial
reach of the Economic Espionage Act “remains limited”). For an account of how narrow judicial
readings have constrained the Economic Espionage Act’s efficacy, see generally Robin L. Kuntz, How
Not to Catch a Thief: Why the Economic Espionage Act Fails to Protect American Trade Secrets, 28
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 901 (2013).
70
Simon Chesterman, The Spy Who Came in from the Cold War: Intelligence and International
Law, 27 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1071, 1077 (2006) (quoting U.S. Intelligence Agencies and Activities: Risks
and Control of Foreign Intelligence: Hearings Before the H. Permanent Select Comm. on Intelligence,
Part 5, 94th Cong. 1767 (1975) (statement of Mitchell Rogovin, Special Counsel to CIA Director)).
71
Treaty Gives Hong Kong Option to Reject Snowden Extradition to the U.S., S. CHINA MORNING
POST (June 10, 2013), http://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/article/1257639/treaty-gives-hong-kongoption-reject-snowden-extradition-us. For the text of the treaty, see Agreement for the Surrender of
Fugitive Offenders, U.S.–H.K., Dec. 20, 1996, T.I.A.S. No. 98-121.
66
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China’s cooperation and the “hope[] that Beijing will ‘respect our criminal
justice system and let justice take its course.’”72 But given Chinese
officials’ denials of economic cyber espionage activities,73 it seems
unlikely that its government will submit the accused to U.S. courts.
U.S. law also addresses the problem of economic cyber espionage
indirectly through the Arms Export Control Act of 1976.74 It gives the
Executive the “authority to control the export of defense articles and
services.”75 However, as a practical matter, the Arms Export Control Act
is similarly limited in its application to the problem of economic cyber
espionage. On its face, it reaches bad actors within the United States who
export prohibited items abroad.76 Thus while the U.S. may be effective at
prosecuting the U.S.-based conduits of technology and trade secrets,
hackers and spies operating abroad may continue to act with legal impunity
for jurisdictional reasons.
In sum, these domestic prohibitions—though forceful to the extent
they apply—provide little deterrent to the continued perpetration of
economic cyber espionage from outside actors. Criminal charges may
ultimately be more symbolic than punitive. Another strategy, which works
outside the U.S. criminal justice system and more directly implicates the
cyber-hacking country’s standing and success in the international
economic arena, is needed to effectively curtail this conduct.
Moreover, the problem of economic cyber espionage is not one for the
United States to solve alone. Economic cyber espionage is a threat that is
international in nature, as it has the potential to upset the global economic
order by destabilizing trade and distorting competition. As a threat to
international security that is shared collectively by all members of the
international community, this is a problem that international law can and
should address.
2. International Law and Espionage
Currently, however, international law seems to tolerate espionage and,

72
Ellen Nakashima & William Wan, Chinese Military Unit Charged with Cyber-Espionage
Against
U.S.
Firms,
WASH.
POST
(May
19,
2014),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us-to-announce-first-criminal-chargesagainst-foreign-country-for-cyberspying/2014/05/19/586c9992-df45-11e3-810f764fe508b82d_story.html.
73
See China Denounces US Cyber-Theft Charges, BBC NEWS (May 20, 2014),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-27477601.
74
22 U.S.C. §§ 2751–2799aa-2 (2012).
75
The Arms Export Control Act, U.S. DEP’T ST., DIRECTORATE DEF. TRADE CONTROLS,
https://www.pmddtc.state.gov/regulations_laws/aeca.html (last visited Apr. 15, 2014).
76
See 22 U.S.C. § 2778 (explaining that the Act applies to “persons of the United States involved
in the export and import of such articles and services”).
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by extension, economic cyber espionage.
While some bodies of
international law might be relevant to spying, none adequately address this
particular threat.78 Indeed, there is no clear consensus among states on the
legal nature of espionage or whether states enjoy a right at international
law to complain of it.79 Oddly, espionage remains “ill-defined under
international law, even though all developed nations, as well as many
lesser-developed ones, conduct spying and eavesdropping operations
against their neighbors.”80 Although no international agreement expressly
condones espionage, “states do not reject it as a violation of international
law.”81 This historical acceptance has given espionage the appearance of
lawful activity, “grounded in the [states’] recognition that ‘custom’ serves
as an authoritative source of international law.”82 To the extent states are
concerned with espionage at all, it is espionage at wartime that vexes them
most.83 Meanwhile, international espionage at peacetime is virtually
ignored.84 The academic literature has been equally silent.85 Indeed,
“[l]eading treatises overlook espionage altogether or contain a perfunctory
paragraph that defines a spy and describes his hapless fate in the event of
capture.”86 Thus there appears to be a lacuna in the international law on
espionage.
States may perceive that economic cyber espionage exists in the same
grey area as peacetime espionage, which is considered “an unfriendly act”
77
See David P. Fidler, Economic Cyber Espionage and International Law: Controversies
Involving Government Acquisition of Trade Secrets Through Cyber Technologies, 17 ASIL INSIGHTS,
no. 10, 2013, at 1, 2, available at http://www.asil.org/sites/default/files/insight130320.pdf (noting that
“[t]he desire to combat economic cyber espionage confronts a lack of international law on espionage
and economic espionage” and the general “participation in, and tolerance of, spying”).
78
See id. (“[R]ules on armed conflict and on diplomatic relations in peacetime[] do not prohibit or
seriously constrain . . . economic espionage.”).
79
See A. John Radsan, The Unresolved Equation of Espionage and International Law, 28 MICH.
J. INT’L L. 595, 602 (2007) (using a three way split in existing literature as support for a “thesis that
espionage is beyond international consensus”).
80
Christopher D. Baker, Tolerance of International Espionage: A Functional Approach, 19 AM.
U. INT’L L. REV. 1091, 1091 (2004).
81
Id. at 1094.
82
Id.
83
See Chesterman, supra note 70, at 1078 (noting that spies caught during wartime have
historically been subject to severe treatment, “reflect[ing] the danger posed by espionage and the
difficulty of guarding against it”). That said, according to Grotius, sending spies in war is “beyond
doubt permitted by the law of nations.” Id. (quoting HUGO GROTIUS, DE JURE BELLI AC PACIS LIBRI
TRES 655 (James Brown Scott ed., Francis W. Kelsey trans., 1925) (1646)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
84
See Radsan, supra note 79, at 603 (“[A]ttention in the law to peacetime espionage has lagged
behind the development of other international norms concerning intelligence gathering.” (quoting
Geoffrey B. Demarest, Espionage in International Law, 24 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 321, 321 (1996))
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
85
Id. at 602 (quoting Richard A. Falk, Foreword to ESSAYS ON ESPIONAGE AND INTERNATIONAL
LAW, at v (Roland J. Stanger ed., 1962)).
86
Id. (quoting Falk, supra note 85, at v) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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87

but not a violation of international law.
Even if they do not view
peacetime espionage as legal, per se, states may nonetheless tolerate this
form of espionage because they perceive it to be in their self-interest.88 By
this account, countries are likely “realistic” about the fact that they will
commit espionage in other countries and want to safeguard their own
option for continuing this practice.89 In any state’s estimation, endorsing
norms against the practice of peacetime espionage would hinder its
security as much as—if not more than—it enhances it. As one scholar has
argued, in this way states “preserve[] the practice [of espionage] as a tool
by which to facilitate international cooperation.”90 On this view, the
“rules” of espionage are not prescribed by law, but rather “are
situational.”91
However, it would be a mistake to afford the same legal treatment to
economic cyber espionage.92 For one, unlike traditional espionage,
economic cyber espionage takes place on a much larger scale. The volume
of information stolen via cyberspace, using cybertools, is much more
significant and happens at a quicker pace than traditional human or
technical intelligence gathering.93 Moreover, the penetration of computer
systems and databases is far more difficult to detect and stop than
traditional human espionage.94 Finally, with economic espionage, there is
no custom of reciprocity or cooperation that states should be concerned
about preserving. With traditional espionage, which focuses on statestrategy and military capacity, one can assume that state spying ensures the
collective security of all nations. A state’s knowledge about its neighbors’
military capabilities allows it to hedge against or prevent a threat. This, in
turn, might decrease the likelihood of any successful or surprise attack. In
this way, traditional espionage functions as a structural constraint against
87
Id. at 603 (quoting Demarest, supra note 84, at 347) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Radsan also points to scholars who view peacetime espionage as illegal. Id. at 604–05.
88
Id. at 605–06; see Chesterman, supra note 70, at 1090 (“One of the reasons for the unusual
treatment of espionage in diplomatic relations is the principle of reciprocity—the recognition that what
one does to another state’s spies will affect that state’s treatment of one’s own agents. The underlying
assumption of this arrangement is that intelligence collection is an important or at least an unavoidable
component of diplomatic relations.”).
89
Radsan, supra note 79, at 606.
90
Baker, supra note 80, at 1092.
91
Radsan, supra note 79, at 606.
92
See generally Susan W. Brenner & Anthony C. Crescenzi, State-Sponsored Crime: The Futility
of the Economic Espionage Act, 28 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 389 (2006) (describing how the nature of
economic espionage has changed significantly due to the proliferation of information in cyberspace).
93
See id. at 395–97 (comparing traditional approaches to economic espionage to those used in the
Internet age).
94
See id. at 397 (“A victimized government, corporation, or individual today will have an
exceptionally challenging task [of] merely identifying the cyber collector who has targeted their
information. This is, of course, assuming the victim is even aware of the fact that he or she has been
subject to an attack!”).

1184

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:1165

open conflict and preserves global stability. Yet there is no such
corresponding benefit to global security that accrues from economic cyber
espionage. In the most likely scenario, the states that perpetrate this
economic spying are motivated to do so because they are still developing
and lack desirable technology, innovation, or best practices.95 Therefore,
no state would be incentivized to preserve its option to return the favor.
The spying state merely harms the victim state’s incentive to innovate,
natural comparative advantages, and robustness as a trading partner.96
For these reasons, it is a mistake not to draw any legal distinction
between traditional espionage and economic cyber espionage. Section B
urges the international community to take seriously a state’s claim that
such conduct violates well-established norms of international law as they
are interpreted to apply to this modern problem.
B. The International Law Norms Against Economic Cyber Espionage
The international community has begun to appreciate that the “old
architecture” of international law is “buckling under the weight of new
threats.”97 This realization and desire to move forward presents a key
moment in which international law can evolve to address the growing
threat of economic cyber espionage. This Section first considers why the
time is ripe for this normative evolution and then considers which norms
must evolve.
1. A “Constitutive Process” for Normative Evolution98
First, one might ask, how is international law made or evolved? The
answer to this question is important to any argument for a new
prescription—after all, there is no definitive “central legislator” for

95

See LEWIS, supra note 3, at 44–45 (describing the experience of China, where political leaders
identified “an immense lag” in technology in the post-Mao era and “made the illicit acquisition of
technology a central element of China’s economic opening to the West”).
96
See id. at 45 (“The theft of IP and confidential business information . . . appears to cost
developed countries much more . . . by damaging economic competitiveness.”).
97
See supra note 20.
98
Professors McDougal, Lasswell, and Reisman originated this theory by which they “refer to
authoritative decision as process.” Myres S. McDougal, Harold D. Lasswell & W. Michael Reisman,
The World Constitutive Process of Authoritative Decision, 19 J. LEGAL EDUC. 253, 258 (1967). By this
theory:
An examination of the world community context corroborates the view that, within
limits, a global system of public order has come into existence that comprises a
constitutive process in which authoritative decision institutions have taken form and
which utilizes these institutions to protect and extend itself and also to contribute to
the shaping and sharing of values other than power.
Id. at 257.
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international law, and the prospect of new law depends, in large part, on
whether international law’s processes of generating norms are properly
activated and engaged.100 This is equally true with respect to economic
cyber espionage. Even though existing norms can be interpreted to
prohibit it, deploying these norms in a new way requires some normative
evolution.
As Professor Michael Reisman has theorized, international law in the
contemporary global order is made pursuant to a multi-dimensional,
“constitutive process.”101 This process is “the context which produces
international law.”102 By this account, today there are various dimensions
of the world community that play a role in the shaping of international law,
including “[t]he economic, environmental and resource dimension of the
world community.”103
The economic dimension ushers into the
international law-making process the voices and concerns of various
players in the transnational market,104 including business entities,
corporations, and research engines from academia and the non-profit
sector. In this modern-day world order, these interests can and do serve to
generate “new principles and governance structures” to regulate
international activity,105 as these participants recognize the “utility of
maintaining and enhancing a stable transnational economic environment
that enables their various enterprises to flourish.”106 On this theory,
international law responds and develops not only to the concerns of a
nation-state, but also to the concerns of the many different players in the
international order, including those in the private economic sector.107
This has led to a “contemporary open process of lawmaking” that is
99

Joost Pauwelyn, The Role of Public International Law in the WTO: How Far Can We Go?, 95
AM. J. INT’L L. 535, 536 (2001).
100
See McDougal et al., supra note 98, at 255 (discussing “[a] world constitutive process of
authoritative decision [which] includes the establishment of an authoritative decision process in the
world community, and its subsequent maintenance, modification, or even termination”).
101
See generally W. MICHAEL REISMAN, THE QUEST FOR WORLD ORDER AND HUMAN DIGNITY
IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: CONSTITUTIVE PROCESS AND INDIVIDUAL COMMITMENT 101–17
(2012) (discussing “the world constitutive process and its decision functions”); see also McDougal et
al., supra note 98, at 279–80 (observing that “[t]he outcomes that flow from the constitutive process
are the decisions that delimit authoritative and controlling participation in the world arena,” including
“prescriptions” regarding, inter alia, “constitutive norms”).
102
REISMAN, supra note 101, at 46.
103
Id. at 58. “That process is, in the broadest sense, the context which produces international law,
within which international law and those practising it have to operate, and which, in turn, they are
trying, in various ways, to direct and regulate.” Id. at 46.
104
Id. at 60–61.
105
Id. at 61.
106
Id. at 60.
107
See id. at 137 (“This dynamic and open process of communication involves a wide range of
non-State actors who play critical roles in the shaping and sustaining of expectations of right
behaviour.”).
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“more dynamic and fluid” than before and “often respond[s] to perceptions
of crisis.”108 A fluid, democratic, and reactive system of international law
should mean that norms, as they exist, are constantly subject to change and
growth, responding to the popular concerns of international law’s
economic participants.109 No longer is international law solely the product
of lex scripta, that is, the usual state-driven methods of lawmaking such as
treaties and other international agreements; it may also develop more
organically.110
All this is to say that the creation of norms regarding economic cyber
espionage does not depend on the formal machinery of international
lawmaking. Instead, they can evolve immediately, in response to the
concerns of those affected—business, industry, the media, and the nonprofit world—as states and powerful economic multilateral institutions are
influenced to reach consensus that such conduct is unlawful.111
That consensus already has a rallying point in existing principles of
customary international law. As derived from the fundamental principle of
state sovereignty, the following Subsection argues that states enjoy a right
to economic sovereignty112 that accrues to the state both for its benefit and
for that of the private economic actors that exist under its aegis. It also
argues that states should be held responsible for the cyber espionage that
they sponsor.
2. Economic Sovereignty and the Right to Non-Economic Intervention
Since the Peace of Westphalia ended the Thirty Years War in 1648, the
global community has ordered itself around a state-based system.113 This

108

Id.
See REISMAN, supra note 101, at 136–37 (“Thus the modalities through which international
law is being prescribed now range over a wide spectrum.”); McDougal et al., supra note 98, at 261
(“All participants in world social process act in the constitutive process of authoritative decision.”).
110
REISMAN, supra note 101, at 136–37; see also Myres S. McDougal & W. Michael Reisman,
The Prescribing Function in World Constitutive Process: How International Law Is Made, 6 YALE
STUDS. WORLD PUB. ORD. 249, 250 (1980) (“The making of law is a decision function which may be
conveniently described as prescription.”).
111
This Article considers the problem from the perspective of the United States. To the extent
other nations and economies are threatened by economic cyber espionage, their interests will also build
pressure for a change in the normative outlook.
112
The general idea of economic sovereignty has existed in the academic literature for some time.
See, e.g., Alan M. Simon & Spencer Weber Waller, A Theory of Economic Sovereignty: An Alternative
to Extraterritorial Jurisdictional Disputes, 22 STAN. J. INT’L L. 337, 348 (1986) (“Economic
sovereignty encompasses the right to continue and preserve economic activities closely linked to the
existence of the state.”).
113
See JOHN KISH, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ESPIONAGE 83 (David Turns ed., 1995) (“The
general principle of exclusive sovereignty over national territory is firmly established in customary
international law. Each State exercises control over its national territory to the exclusion of all other
States, and any limitation of this authority is subject to the consent of the territorial State.”).
109
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Westphalian system places the state and its “sovereignty at its core.”114
According to international relations scholars, “Westphalian” is “an
‘institutional arrangement for organizing political life that is based on two
principles: territoriality and the exclusion of external actors from domestic
authority structures.’”115 At base, “Westphalian sovereignty is violated
when external actors influence or determine domestic authority
structures.”116
Though the Westphalian version of sovereignty has historically been
linked to territorial control, the conceptual underpinnings of sovereignty
are not necessarily limited to land or physical spaces. Instead, sovereignty
is a principle that is mainly concerned with protecting national power bases
and a state’s exclusive right to control them.117 It thus requires that “any
limitation of this authority is subject to the consent of the . . . State.”118
Today, a state’s ability to safeguard its sovereignty—the essential aspects
of its statehood—depends not only on control of its borders, but also on
control of its economy and private sources of wealth. Threats to these
economic aspects of a state’s integrity are increasingly mounted through
cyberspace. It follows then that sovereignty also proscribes external
attempts to manipulate or infringe on a state’s national economic spaces
(as defined to include the private sector), including those launched in
cyberspace, even if such acts fall below a conventional threshold of
force.119
Customary international law120 also supports an expanded notion of

114

Andreas Osiander, Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Westphalian Myth, 55 INT’L
ORG. 251, 251 (2001); see Benjamin Straumann, The Peace of Westphalia as a Secular Constitution,
15 CONSTELLATIONS 173, 173 (2008) (noting that Westphalia is perceived as the “origin” of the
principle of state sovereignty).
115
Straumann, supra note 114, at 173 (quoting STEPHEN D. KRASNER, SOVEREIGNTY:
ORGANIZED HYPOCRISY 20 (1999)).
116
Id.
117
See KISH, supra note 113, at 84 (“As general rules of international law safeguard the
sovereignty of every State over its national territory, any limitation of territorial sovereignty depends on
agreement between the territorial State and other States.”).
118
Id. at 83.
119
Others have made the point that sovereignty applies in cyberspace. See, e.g., Schmitt, supra
note 63, at 177 (“States have a sovereign right to exercise control over cyberinfrastructure and activities
on their territory as well as to protect them from harmful actions.”); cf. Chesterman, supra note 70, at
1081 (noting that sovereignty suggests legal limits on espionage even when it falls below the threshold
standard defining certain uses of force).
120
According to Professor Michael Paulsen:
[Customary international law] refers to the norms and practices of nations, apart
from treaties or other written agreements. Within the regime of international law, it
is “law” inferred from “a general and consistent practice of states followed by them
from a sense of legal obligation.” It is, in effect, a body of unwritten international
“common law” principles.
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sovereignty, which includes a concept of economic sovereignty that
protects private sector actors that contribute to the nation’s economic
security. As the following discussion shows, international courts and
tribunals have interpreted state sovereignty and the related principles of
non-intervention and state responsibility quite broadly, without limiting
them to the physical domain.121 Particularly where, as here, a global threat
is new and states have not yet had an opportunity to address it through
practice, these legal precedents can “influenc[e] the subsequent practice of
States and international organizations”122 to apply the principle of
economic sovereignty to prohibit economic cyber espionage.
a. A Broad Understanding of Non-Intervention
A state’s sovereignty confers on it a right to be free from the unwanted
intervention of another state.123 The International Court of Justice (ICJ)
considers this principle of non-intervention part of customary international
law.124
In expounding on it, the ICJ expressed a broad view of sovereignty in
Nicaragua v. United States.125 There, the court considered whether the
United States’ support to the Nicaraguan contras was justified by the
fact—if proven—that the Sandinista Government of Nicaragua was
supplying arms to insurgents in El Salvador.126 To evaluate the United
States’ justifications, the court considered the “principle of nonintervention in customary international law.”127 The ICJ found that “the
support given by the United States, up to the end of September 1984, to the
military and paramilitary activities of the contras in Nicaragua, by
Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Constitutional Power to Interpret International Law, 118 YALE L.J. 1762,
1800 (2009) (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S. § 102(2)
(1987)). According to the Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), customary international
law is “a general practice accepted as law.” Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38(1)(b),
June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 1060.
121
The authors of the Tallinn Manual have made this point in their thorough and expert analysis
of international law in cyberspace. Specifically, they explain that, based on their conclusion that
“general principles of international law appl[y] to cyberspace,” it follows that “legal concepts [such] as
sovereignty, jurisdiction, and State responsibility” are part of “international cyber security law.”
TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 7, at 14. They refer to “the hostile use of cyberspace” and these
principles’ relationship to jus in bello. Id.; see also Schmitt, supra note 63, at 177 (“[A] thick web of
international norms suffuses cyberspace.”); infra Parts III.B.3.a–c.
122
ICRC, Assessment of Customary International Law, http://www.icrc.org/customaryihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_in_asofcuin (last visited Apr. 15, 2014); see id. (“[A] finding by an international
court that a rule of customary international law exists constitutes persuasive evidence to that effect.”).
123
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14,
¶ 202 (June 27).
124
KIMBERLEY N. TRAPP, STATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM 30 (2011).
125
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. ¶ 201.
126
Id. ¶¶ 93, 126, 128.
127
Id. ¶ 201.
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financial support, training, supply of weapons, intelligence and logistic
support, constitute[d] a clear breach of the principle of nonintervention.”128 The court held:
[I]n international law, if one State, with a view to coercion of
another State, supports and assists armed bands in that State
whose purpose is to overthrow the government of that State,
that amounts to an intervention by the one State in the
internal affairs of the other, whether or not the political
objective of the State giving such support and assistance is
equally far-reaching.129
In reviewing state practice on non-intervention, the court’s concept of
sovereignty was broader than physical territory principles:
As regards . . . the content of the principle of nonintervention . . . in view of the generally accepted
formulations, the principle forbids all States or groups of
States to intervene directly or indirectly in internal or
external affairs of other States. A prohibited intervention
must accordingly be one bearing on matters in which each
State is permitted, by the principle of State sovereignty, to
decide freely. One of these is the choice of a political,
economic social and cultural system, and the formulation of
foreign policy. Intervention is wrongful when it uses
methods of coercion in regard to such choices, which must
remain free ones.130
This ICJ holding confirms that coercion need not be by military force, but
can result from any impediment to a state’s ability to “decide freely” in
matters that touch on any aspect of that state’s sovereignty.131
“[C]oercion,” after all, was held to “define[], and indeed form[] the very
essence of, prohibited intervention.”132 Arguably, the spying and stealing
of economic property in cyber space can be seen as a form of coercion that
impermissibly interferes with both the internal and external affairs of a
state.133

128

Id. ¶ 242.
Id. ¶ 241.
130
Id. ¶ 205. The Tallinn Manual experts reference the ICJ’s Nicaragua holding during their
articulations of various cyber security law principles. E.g., TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 7, at 26, 44–
47, 55, 58.
131
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. ¶ 205; TRAPP,
supra note 124, at 31.
132
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. ¶ 205.
133
As others have observed:
129
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The Nicaragua decision thus supports an expansive customary norm
that a state is sovereign in its economic—not only territorial—spaces, and
that the principle of non-intervention gives rise to prohibitions on a state’s
interference in that economic space. The rigorous right to exclusive
control over a state’s economic affairs should also extend to protect the
private-sector actors that comprise a critical component of the state’s
proprietary economic space. Economic sovereignty, as derived from the
court’s holding in Nicaragua, therefore imposes obligations on states to
refrain from interfering with private-sector economic actors through the
use of coercive tactics like economic cyber espionage.134 As the following
discussion shows, it also prohibits states from sponsoring or supporting
such activity.
b. State Responsibility Based on Knowledge and Control
The Corfu Channel case holds that states may be held accountable for
unlawful activity committed from within its territory if the circumstances
suggest the state had knowledge of it.135 Corfu Channel involved a dispute
between the United Kingdom and Albania that was brought before the ICJ
in 1947.136 The case involved whether, among other things, Albania was
responsible for laying mines that were struck by British ships while
crossing the Corfu Channel in 1946.137 The Channel had been declared
free of mines in 1944, and so Britain argued that the mines had been
recently laid, either by Albania or “with its connivance or knowledge.”138
On April 9, 1949, the ICJ rendered its decision as to whether Albania
could be held responsible for the mines.139 Since there was no direct
[T]he ICJ held that US financing of the contras did not amount to a breach of the
prohibition of the use of force, although it was an illegal intervention in the domestic
affairs of Nicaragua. By analogy, assistance with diplomatic assets or providing
transportation or intelligence, none of which, by themselves, imply a use of force,
could amount to a breach of the principle of non-intervention, but not the prohibition
of the use of force.
TRAPP, supra note 124, at 31–32 (footnote omitted).
134
Cf. Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4, 43 (Apr. 9) (separate opinion of Judge
Alvarez) (“Sovereignty confers rights upon States and imposes obligations on them.”).
135
See id. at 18, 22–23 (majority opinion) (finding that Albania must have had knowledge of the
mines that were in Albanian waters and that they were therefore responsible for their explosion). The
Tallinn Manual interprets this opinion to mean that “[t]he obligation to respect the sovereignty of
another State . . . implies that a State may not ‘allow knowingly its territory to be used for acts contrary
to the rights of other States.’” TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 7, at 26 (quoting Corfu Channel, 1949
I.C.J. at 22).
136
Application Instituting Proceedings in Corfu Channel, 1949 I.C.J. Pleadings 8, 8 (May 22,
1947).
137
Corfu Channel, 1949 I.C.J. at 27–28.
138
Memorial of United Kingdom, Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. Pleadings 19, ¶¶ 73,
76 (Sept. 30, 1947).
139
Corfu Channel, 1949 I.C.J. at 23.
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evidence that Albania had known about the mines, the court considered
circumstantial evidence.140 The court found it “clearly established that the
Albanian Government constantly kept a close watch” over the Channel, as
evidenced by certain diplomatic notes protesting the passage of ships
through the Channel as well as earlier firings on British ships.141 This
evidence persuaded the court that “whoever the authors of the minelaying
were, it could not have been done without the Albanian Government’s
knowledge.”142 The court’s holding in this regard confirmed that
circumstantial evidence of a state’s knowledge of an unlawful act
committed within its territory can, in certain circumstances, be sufficient
for holding that state responsible for it.
The principle of state responsibility evolved with the ICJ’s decision in
Nicaragua v. United States.143 There, the court further refined the
parameters of state responsibility and established an “effective control” test
for attributing acts of non-state actors to the state.144 But perhaps more
important for economic cyber espionage was the International Criminal
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia’s critical analysis of the Nicaragua test
in Prosecutor v. Tadic.145 In that case, the Appeals Chamber concluded
that, with respect to organized groups, “overall control” should be the
operative test, that is, whether the “state . . . has a role in organizing,
coordinating or planning the military actions of the . . . group.”146 After
Nicaragua and Tadic, a state may be held responsible for the unlawful
actions of those putative non-state actors on its territory where the state has
knowledge of this activity and some role in its orchestration. Precisely as
Michael Schmitt points out, “international law . . . obligates states to
ensure that cyberinfrastructure on their territory is not used for acts that
unlawfully affect other states.”147
140

Id. at 18.
Id. at 18–19. It also considered expert evidence that any minelayers would have been seen by
Albanian lookouts. Id. at 20–22.
142
Id. at 17. The U.K. advanced this theory, id., and following an examination of the facts, the
court agreed, id. at 22.
143
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14
(June 27).
144
Id. ¶ 20.
145
Case No IT-94-1-A, Judgment (July 15, 1999).
146
Id. ¶¶ 120, 137. With respect to individuals, the Appeals Chamber stated:
141

[I]f it is proved that individuals who are not regarded as organs of a State by its
legislation nevertheless do in fact act on behalf of that State, their acts are
attributable to the State. The rationale behind this rule is to prevent States from
escaping international responsibility by having private individuals carry out tasks
that may not or should not be performed by State officials.
Id. ¶ 117. Such individuals, however, must have “specific instructions or directives” to commit
unlawful acts if the state is to be held responsible. Id. ¶ 132.
147
Schmitt, supra note 63, at 177.
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A robust notion of state responsibility, derived from this case law, is
necessary to bring economic cyber espionage within the bounds of the
law—as this conduct is typically shrouded in state denial and therefore
difficult to attribute directly to a state.
c. The Law of Armed Conflict
International law scholars and military specialists have begun to
consider how the law of armed conflict applies to large-scale, kinetic-level
cyber attacks.148 One leading result of this effort is the Tallinn Manual,
published by law-of-war scholars in 2013.149 The Tallinn Manual
considers “[t]he legality of cyber intelligence activities . . . as they relate to
the jus ad bellum notions of ‘use of force’ and ‘armed attack’, or as
relevant in the context of an armed conflict governed by the jus in
bello.”150 The Tallinn Manual is not, however, addressed to “[c]yber
activities that occur below the level of a ‘use of force,’ . . . like cyber
criminality.”151
Nevertheless, several of the underlying principles
discussed in the Tallinn Manual indirectly suggest a basis for holding
states accountable for economic cyber espionage.
For example, according to Rule 1 of the Tallinn Manual, “A cyber
operation by a State directed against cyber infrastructure located in another
State may violate the latter’s sovereignty.”152 The experts note that,
although the traditional “violation of sovereignty was limited to actions by,
or attributable to States . . . there is an embryonic view proffered by some
148
For examples of recent commentary on this subject, see generally Michael Gervais, Cyber
Attacks and the Law of War, 30 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 525 (2012), Todd C. Huntley, Controlling the
Use of Force in Cyber Space: The Application of the Law of Armed Conflict During a Time of
Fundamental Change in the Nature of Warfare, 60 NAVAL L. REV. 1 (2010), and Matthew C. Waxman,
Cyber-Attacks and the Use of Force: Back to the Future of Article 2(4), 36 YALE J. INT’L L. 421
(2011).
149
TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 7. The Tallinn Manual “results from an expert-driven process
designed to produce a non-binding document applying existing law to cyber warfare” and “examines
the international law governing ‘cyber warfare.’” Id. at 1, 3. The Tallinn Manual also speaks generally
to how traditional principles or rules of international law apply to cyberspace. Id. pt. I.
150
Id. at 3–4. This Article agrees that a counter-response of force would not be an appropriate
response to economic cyber espionage, and argues that this threat should be contained with a rule of
law response. Others have suggested differently. See, e.g., Schmitt, supra note 63, at 178 (“[I]t is
questionable whether the historic exclusion of economic warfare should be interpreted as extending to
cyberoperations that generate dramatic economic consequences.”). NATO has also issued an advisory
manual that discusses “how international law applies to online attacks by the state, and warns that
online attacks could lead to full-blown military conflicts.” Hayley Dixon, Rules of Cyberwar Set Out
for First Time in NATO Manual, TELEGRAPH (Mar. 19, 2013), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/
9939401/Rules-of-cyberwar-set-out-for-first-time-in-Nato-manual.html. The manual was authored by
NATO’s Co-operative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence and “defines a cyber attack as one that is
reasonably expected to cause injury or death to persons or damage or destruction to objects.” Id.
(internal quotation marks omitted).
151
TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 7, at 3–4.
152
Id. at 16.
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scholars that cyber operations conducted by non-State actors may also
violate a State’s sovereignty.”153 Also, pursuant to Rule 6, “[a] State bears
international responsibility for a cyber operation attributable to it and
which constitutes a breach of an international obligation.”154 And “persons
or entities” that are “specifically empowered” by the state are, for purposes
of international law, “equated to State organs,” including private entities
“granted the authority . . . to engage in cyber intelligence gathering.”155
Again, the Tallinn Manual stops short of applying the law of state
responsibility to economic cyber espionage, noting “international law does
not address espionage per se” and it therefore cannot “amount to an
‘internationally wrongful act.’”156 However, to the extent this Article
argues that economic cyber espionage is distinct from traditional espionage
and violates a state’s economic sovereignty in a more coercive way, the
Tallinn Manual’s rules may be relevant to those acts.
***
The foregoing Part demonstrated that, although international law is not
often mobilized to combat instances of traditional espionage, economic
cyber espionage should be treated differently. It is more coercive than
traditional espionage insofar as it deprives a state of exclusive control of its
economic space (a key source of power), and therefore directly violates the
right to economic sovereignty and causes concrete harm to the state. From
this it follows that a state which controls, directs, acknowledges, or
supports cyber espionage against another state may be held responsible
under the international law doctrine of state responsibility, provided there
is knowledge and some appropriate level of control over the groups or
entities (or even individuals) that engage in it.
Applying these customary norms to economic espionage, however, is
not enough. In order to make a norm against economic cyber espionage
meaningful, it must truly become state practice. And in order for that state
recognition to take hold, there must be an institutional mechanism
available for states to assert a claim for economic cyber espionage. That
mechanism must also have the ability to ensure compliance through a
credible means of rendering a decision and enforcing it. The next Part
argues that the WTO is the proper institutional mechanism for channeling
these norms into state practice.

153

Id. at 18.
Id. at 29.
155
Id. at 31.
156
Id. at 30.
154
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IV. DEVELOPING STATE PRACTICE AGAINST ECONOMIC ESPIONAGE:
ASSERTING CLAIMS IN THE WTO
A norm is of little value without a legal mechanism to enforce it.
Where Part III considered the problem of anormativity in the area of
economic cyber espionage, this Part considers and proposes a solution to
the lack of institutional implementation arrangements. Focusing on
recognition and enforcement of the norm against economic cyber
espionage, it considers how a victim state might assert a claim for the
violation of its economic sovereignty caused by the continued use of
economic cyber espionage. This Part argues that an international
economic institution like the WTO is the most appropriate and effective
forum for regulating economic cyber espionage, particularly when
perpetrated by states motivated by the simultaneous desire for economic
expansion and economic integration, such as China. The WTO provides a
legal framework already dedicated to fair trade and competition, and it has
the power and authority necessary to ensure compliance with its
judgments.
This Part first considers how the WTO rules of law fit together with
the customary principles developed in Part III. It argues that certain WTO
rules, when considered through the lens of a contemporary right to
economic sovereignty, protect member states against economic cyber
espionage. This Part also argues that the right to economic sovereignty—
and a state’s corresponding obligation to refrain from economic cyber
espionage—can be asserted within the WTO’s existing dispute settlement
framework. Finally, this Part details how a trade-based system would be
effective in halting and deterring illegal cyber conduct in the case of China.
A. WTO Law and the Norm of Economic Sovereignty
1. WTO Treaty-Based Protections of Intellectual Property
The WTO is a multilateral economic institution157 that provides for,
among other trade-related rights, rigorous protection of intellectual and
industrial property rights between member states through its treaties and
various agreements.158 The WTO’s Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects
157
See What Is the World Trade Organization?, WORLD TRADE ORG.,
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact1_e.htm (last visited Apr. 15, 2014) (“Most
nations—including almost all the main trading nations—are members of the system. But some are not,
so ‘multilateral’ is used to describe the system instead of ‘global’ or ‘world.’”).
158
The United States and China are both member states. For a full list of membership, see
Members and Observers, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/or
g6_e.htm (last visited Apr. 15, 2014). For a very basic overview of the treatment of intellectual
property in the WTO, see WORLD TRADE ORG., UNDERSTANDING THE WTO 39–43 (2011) [hereinafter
UNDERSTANDING THE WTO], available at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/underst
anding_e.pdf.

2014]

AN INTERNATIONAL LAW RESPONSE TO ECONOMIC CYBER ESPIONAGE

1195

of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) was negotiated during the 1986–
1994 Uruguay Round of trade talks.159 TRIPS “introduced intellectual
property rules into the multilateral trading system for the first time.”160
The goal of the Agreement is to “narrow the gaps in the way these rights
are protected around the world, and to bring them under common
international rules.”161 Importantly, the Agreement “establishes minimum
levels of protection that each government has to give the intellectual
property of fellow WTO members.”162 Specifically, the second part of the
TRIPS Agreement considers exactly how to protect certain kinds of
intellectual property rights and takes as its “starting point” the obligations
set out in the main international agreements of the World Intellectual
Property Organization (WIPO).163
The TRIPS Agreement and the conventions it incorporates protect
several substantive rights related to economic cyber espionage. For
example, it protects “[t]rade secrets and other types of ‘undisclosed
information’ which have commercial value.”164 This information “must be
protected against breach of confidence and other acts contrary to honest
commercial practices.”165 The TRIPS Agreement also protects industrial
designs166 and provides for national treatment regarding industrial property
by incorporating the Paris Convention of 1883, which states “each
contracting State must grant the same protection to nationals of the other
contracting States as it grants to its own nationals.”167 Through that
Convention, TRIPS also sets out a common rule that “[e]ach contracting
State must provide for effective protection against unfair competition.”168
And TRIPS protects copyrights, including computer programs and
159
UNDERSTANDING THE WTO, supra note 158, at 39. For a general description of the Uruguay
Round, see The Uruguay Round, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/
tif_e/fact5_e.htm (last visited Apr. 15, 2014).
160
Intellectual Property: Protection and Enforcement, WORLD TRADE ORG.,
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm7_e.htm (last visited Apr. 15, 2014)
[hereinafter WTO IP Protection and Enforcement].
161
Id.
162
Id. (emphasis added).
163
Id. The first part of the Agreement deals with basic principles. Those principles include
national treatment (“treating one’s own nationals and foreigners equally”), and most-favored-nation
treatment (“equal treatment for nationals of all trading partners in the WTO”). Id.
164
Id.; see Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art. 39, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 108 Stat. 4809,
1869 U.N.T.S. 299 [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement] (pronouncing that member states have a duty to
protect undisclosed information).
165
WTO IP Protection and Enforcement, supra note 160.
166
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 164, arts. 25–26.
167
Summary of the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property (1883), WORLD
INTELL. PROP. ORG., http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/paris/summary_paris.html (last visited Apr. 15,
2014).
168
Id.
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databases within the scope of protection.
Patent protection is likewise
broad: “[p]atent protection must be available for both products and
processes, in almost all fields of technology.”170
Together, these rights and enforcement principles suggest two things
relevant to economic cyber espionage. First, the rules require member
states to protect innovative economic activity that is not necessarily
developed or owned by the state itself, but rather by private economic
actors.171 Second, member states are bound to protect one another’s
intellectual property and refrain from any activity that impedes those
rights.172 At first blush, the WTO thus appears an obvious forum for
asserting complaints about economic cyber espionage. Indeed, some
experts already “have argued that the United States should use
international trade law’s protections for intellectual property against
countries engaged in economic cyber espionage.”173
However, WTO members have apparently “shown no interest” in
pursuing this path, “despite mounting worries about this practice.”174 And
the United States has not yet pursued any claim against China for
economic cyber espionage through the WTO.175 This reluctance appears to
stem, in part, from an overly narrow interpretation of the TRIPS rules. As
David Fidler points out, WTO members would likely agree that to
“covertly obtain intellectual property of nationals of other WTO members
operating in their territories could violate WTO obligations to protect such
property.”176 But whether members would also consider WTO rules
violated where a member state obtained such “information from private
sector entities located outside their territories” remains an open question.177
Member states may thus assume that there is no basis for claiming
169

TRIPS Agreement, supra note 164, arts. 9–10.
UNDERSTANDING THE WTO, supra note 158, at 41; see TRIPS Agreement, supra note 164,
arts. 27–34 (outlining the patent-related rights of member states).
171
Cf. Geoffrey D. Antell, Book Note, 46 HARV. INT’L L.J. 527, 527 (2005) (reviewing GREGORY
SHAFFER, DEFENDING INTERESTS: PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS IN WTO LITIGATION (2003))
(“[A]lthough only WTO Member States can bring litigation before the WTO, private actors such as
corporations and activists play an important role in states’ decisions about which cases to bring.”).
172
WTO IP Protection and Enforcement, supra note 160.
173
Fidler, supra note 77, at 3; see also LEWIS, supra note 3, at 49 (suggesting that the United
States should pursue cyber espionage and intellectual property theft claims against China in the WTO).
174
Fidler, supra note 77, at 3.
175
The Wall Street Journal recently reported that some U.S. officials may consider WTO action
as one of several options. Siobhan Gorman et al., U.S. to Rev Up Hacking Fight, WALL ST. J., May 23,
2014, at A1. To date, however, the United States has brought only one case directly against China in
the WTO under TRIPS and it did not pertain to cyber espionage. China—Measures Affecting the
Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, WORLD TRADE ORG.,
www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds362_e.htm (last visited Apr. 15, 2014).
176
Fidler, supra note 77, at 3.
177
Id. (emphasis added); see id. (stating that WTO cases have not involved “accusations against
government-sponsored espionage”).
170
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economic cyber espionage violates the TRIPS Agreement because “WTO
rules create obligations for WTO members to fulfill within their territories
and do not generally impose duties that apply outside those limits.”178
This assumption may prove too much. If a member state’s actions
taken from within its territory infringe on another member state’s
intellectual property rights, should not the WTO rules apply? That the
harm is done in cyber space seems a poor reason to limit application of the
TRIPS Agreement, which was, in any event, negotiated before the rise of
cyber threats to trade and intellectual property rights. After all, the general
goals of the TRIPS Agreement, found in its preamble, are to “reduce
distortions and impediments to international trade . . . [and] promote
effective and adequate protection of intellectual property rights.”179 In
short, to remain relevant, the WTO Agreements must consider the
possibility of cyber violations.
Further, the fact that the WTO rules are silent as to economic cyber
espionage is not an indication that those rules do not apply. The next
Subsection explains why the scope of the WTO agreements should be
determined by reference to modernized norms of economic sovereignty
and non-intervention in economic affairs180 and argues that the TRIPS
Agreement should, in fact, be recognized to protect member states against
the economic cyber espionage of other member states.
2. Customary International Law and WTO Treaty-Based Rules
Though TRIPS may not address economic cyber espionage explicitly,
its rules may nevertheless be interpreted to prohibit that conduct,
particularly when general international law suggests that they should. A
prevailing view is that “[g]eneral international law fills the gaps left by
treaties,” unless there is a conflict between the provisions or an express
exclusion of the customary principle.181 Otherwise, “[e]very international
convention must be deemed tacitly to refer to general principles of
international law for all questions which it does not itself resolve in express
terms and in a different way.”182
More specifically, it is well-accepted that general international law
applies in the WTO. Joost Pauwelyn explains that “WTO rules are part of
178

Id.
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 164, pmbl.
180
See supra Part III.B (discussing states’ rights to economic sovereignty, rights to non-economic
intervention, and responsibility for the sponsorship of non-state cyber espionage).
181
Pauwelyn, supra note 99, at 536; see id. at 542 (“In international law, there is . . . a
presumption in favor of continuity or against conflict, in the sense that if a treaty does not contract out
of a preexisting rule, that rule (being of the same inherent value as the new one) continues to exist.”
(footnote omitted)).
182
Id. at 541 (quoting Pinson v. United Mexican States, 5 R.I.A.A. 327, 422 (Perm. Ct. Arb.
1928)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
179
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the wider corpus of public international law” and are properly considered
“rules of international law that . . . constitute lex specialis vis-à-vis certain
rules of general international law.”183 Accordingly, those non-WTO rules
that existed before the WTO treaty was signed on April 15, 1994, and are
“relevant to and may have an impact on WTO rules[,] and . . . have not
been contracted out of, deviated from, or replaced by the WTO treaty”
continue to apply.184 The same is true for “non-WTO rules that are created
subsequently to the WTO treaty . . . and . . . are relevant to and may have
an impact on WTO rules” and “add to or confirm existing WTO rules.”185
All of these non-WTO rules, which “consist mainly of general
international law,”186 would therefore include customary norms of
economic sovereignty and non-intervention in economic affairs as
interpreted to proscribe economic cyber espionage. This gap-filling
function of non-conflicting customary norms is explicitly confirmed in
Article 3.2 of the DSU.187 It states “that WTO covered agreements must be
clarified ‘in accordance with customary rules of interpretation of public
international law.’”188
The WTO case law has followed this approach and resorted to
customary international law for interpretive supplementation. As the panel
in Korea—“Government Procurement” generally explained:
Customary international law applies generally to the
economic relations between the WTO members. . . . [T]o the
extent there is no conflict or inconsistency, or an expression
in a covered WTO agreement that implies differently, we are
of the view that the customary rules of international law
apply to the WTO treaties and to the process of treaty
formation under the WTO.189
This statement mirrored the view expressed by the panel in United States—
“Gasoline” that WTO agreements should “not . . . be read in clinical
isolation from public international law.”190
WTO cases have thus accepted that the customary principle of good
faith is useful in interpreting member states’ performance of their treaty
183

Id. at 538, 539.
Id. at 540.
185
Id. at 541.
186
Id. at 540.
187
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes art. 3.2, Apr.
15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S.
401 [hereinafter DSU].
188
Pauwelyn, supra note 99, at 542 (quoting DSU, supra note 187, art. 3.2).
189
Panel Report, Korea—Measures Affecting Government Procurement, ¶ 7.96, WT/DS163/R
(May 1, 2000).
190
Appellate Body Report, United States—Standards for Reformulated and Conventional
Gasoline, ¶ 17, WT/DS2/R (Apr. 29, 1996).
184
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obligations. For example, the United States—“EC Hormones” panel
explained that “[g]ood faith is a general principle of international law that
governs all reciprocal actions of States,” and therefore “agree[d] with the
European Communities that every party to an international agreement must
be presumed to be performing its obligation under that agreement in good
faith.”191 The appellate body in United States—“Hot-Rolled Steel” also
relied on the principle of good faith in interpreting the Anti-Dumping
Agreement.192 In examining paragraph 2 of Annex II in light of a good
faith obligation, the appellate body found that a state’s investigating
authority was prevented from imposing unreasonable burdens on
exporters.193
WTO panels have referred to other customary principles as well,
including notions of state responsibility. For example, the panel in
Turkey—“Textiles” considered whether Turkey was responsible for certain
quantitative restrictive import measures taken by the Turkey-EC customs
union.194 Among other reasons for holding Turkey responsible, the panel
concluded that “in public international law, in the absence of any contrary
treaty provision, Turkey could reasonably be held responsible for the
measures taken by the Turkey EC customs union.”195 Similarly, the
Australia—“Salmon” panel referred both to general international law and
WTO law to determine that certain import measures taken by Tasmania
were to be “regarded as a measure taken by Australia.”196 The WTO case
law thus supports Pauwelyn’s thesis that “[t]he WTO is not a secluded
island but part of the territorial domain of international law” and that
“public international law . . . is enriching and continues to enrich WTO
law.”197
The WTO agreements’ silence on the issue of cyber trade violations
presents a classic situation in which customary principles should be
191
Panel Report, United States—Continued Suspension of Obligations in the EC-Hormones
Dispute, ¶ 7.317, WT/DS320/R, modified by Appellate Body Report WT/DS320/AB/R (Nov. 14,
2008); see also Anastasios Gourgourinis, Lex Specialis in WTO and Investment Protection Law 24
(Soc’y of Int’l Econ. Law, Working Paper No. 2010/37, 2010), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1634051 (discussing the EC-Hormones case).
192
Appellate Body Report, United States—Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Hot-Rolled Steel
Products from Japan, ¶ 101, WT/DS184/AB/R (July 21, 2001).
193
Id. ¶ 102.
194
Panel Report, Turkey—Restrictions on Imports of Textile and Clothing Products, ¶¶ 8.3, 9.339.35, WT/DS34/R, modified by Appellate Body Report, WT/DS34/AB/R (Nov. 19, 1999).
195
Id. ¶ 9.42; see Gourgourinis, supra note 191, at 23 (describing how the panel resorted to
customary international law because the agreements did not specifically address the issue); see also
HELMUT PHILIPP AUST, COMPLICITY AND THE LAW OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY 152 (2011) (noting that
this case could suggest “that complicit State action could potentially also lead to findings of noncompliance with GATT obligations by the WTO dispute settlement mechanism”).
196
Panel Report, Australia—Measures Affecting Importation of Salmon—Recourse to Article 21.5
by Canada, ¶ 7.12, WT DS184/AB/R (Feb. 18, 2000).
197
Pauwelyn, supra note 99, at 552.
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consulted to interpret the agreements’ scope and applicability in this
domain. No TRIPS provision has explicitly (and entirely) contracted out
of the fundamental tenants of state sovereignty and state responsibility.198
Nor is TRIPS inconsistent with these general principles. The economic
corollaries of sovereignty and non-intervention—in addition to the wellrecognized requirement to comply with one’s treaty obligations in good
faith—should therefore give rise to a cognizable claim that economic cyber
espionage violates TRIPS.199 On this view, the WTO agreements would
not exclude a claim of economic cyber espionage simply because the
conduct “involves governments obtaining information from private-sector
companies located outside their territories.”200 Arguably, it would be
contrary to both the letter and spirit of the WTO agreements to fail to
recognize such a claim.
3. The WTO Mechanisms for Enforcement
As a global matter, the TRIPS Agreement takes the existence of
intellectual property rights seriously, and duly recognizes the need for
enforcement, as “[h]aving intellectual property laws is not enough. They
have to be enforced.”201 Part III of the TRIPS Agreement is thus
specifically dedicated to enforcement and imposes a requirement upon
governments “to ensure that intellectual property rights can be enforced
under their laws, and that penalties for infringement are tough enough to
deter . . . violations.”202 Consistent with the spirit of rigorous enforcement,
the DSU has broad jurisdiction in construing what constitutes a claim:
“WTO rules have an ‘all-affecting’ character, which means that even
198

The DSU has apparently contracted out of some general rules on state responsibility.
Pauwelyn, supra note 99, at 539. However, at least some scholars believe that the principles of state
responsibility remain relevant to WTO claims. See id. at 542 & n.51 (positing, as a matter of treaty
interpretation, that it is “not so clear” that the DSU completely contracted out of state responsibility
rules). In addition to those WTO cases discussed above, others have considered this customary
principle in their decisions. For example, the Appellate Body referred to customary principles of state
responsibility, as set out by the ILC, to interpret the definition of a “public body” in the context of the
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures.
See WTO Analytical Index:
Dispute Settlement Understanding, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/
analytic_index_e/dsu_10_e.htm#1683 (last visited Mar. 15, 2014) (discussing the US—Anti-Dumping
and Countervailing Duties case); see also id. (discussing the Canada—Dairy case in which the Panel
also resorted to the ILC’s Draft Articles on State Responsibility to determine whether a particular entity
had acted pursuant to delegated government authority and could therefore be considered an “agency” of
the Canadian government).
199
See Gourgourinis, supra note 191, at 22 (referring to the customary countermeasure defense
and arguing that to “the extent that WTO treaties do not explicitly . . . contract-out” from a particular
aspect of customary law, these norms remain available “to raise in WTO adjudication so as to justify
WTO violations”).
200
Fidler, supra note 77, at 3.
201
WTO IP Protection and Enforcement, supra note 160.
202
Id.
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disputes with a relatively limited trade aspect can be brought before the
WTO.”203 Arguably, with such a broad enforcement prerogative, the
principles of economic sovereignty and non-economic intervention would
be proper parts of a member state’s claim that TRIPS rules have been
violated by economic cyber espionage.
However, even if economic cyber espionage was not recognized as a
direct violation of the TRIPS Agreement, the behavior should be
actionable as a non-violation complaint. Non-violation complaints allow a
member state to appeal to the Dispute Settlement Body in certain
circumstances where an agreement has not been directly violated.204 They
are “allowed if one government can show that it has been deprived of an
expected benefit because of another government’s action, or because of
any other situation that exists. The aim [of the non-violation complaint] is
to help preserve the balance of benefits struck during multilateral
negotiations.”205 The provision allowing for such claims is found in
Article XXIII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT),
which provides, in relevant part:
If any contracting party should consider that any benefit
accruing to it directly or indirectly under this Agreement is
being nullified or impaired or that the attainment of any
objective of the Agreement is being impeded as the result of
(a) the failure of another contracting party to carry out its
obligations under this Agreement, or (b) the application by
another contracting party of any measure, whether or not it
conflicts with the provisions of this Agreement, or (c) the
existence of any other situation, the contracting party may,
with a view to the satisfactory adjustment of the matter, make
written representations or proposals to the other contracting
party or parties which it considers to be concerned. Any
contracting party thus approached shall give sympathetic
consideration to the representations or proposals made to
it.206
Article 64 of the TRIPS Agreement, which deals with dispute settlement,
refers to Article XXIII(1) of GATT,207 suggesting non-violation complaints

203

Pauwelyn, supra note 99, at 553.
TRIPS: “Non-Violation” Complaints (Article 64.2), Background and the Current Situation,
WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/nonviolation_background_e.htm
(last visited Apr. 15, 2014) [hereinafter TRIPS: Non-Violation Complaints].
205
Id.
206
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, art. XXIII, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S.
194 [hereinafter GATT].
207
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 164, art. 64.1.
204
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208

are in theory possible under TRIPS.
However, there is currently a moratorium on the use of non-violation
complaints in connection with TRIPS set out under Article 64.2 of
TRIPS.209 The moratorium was most recently extended to December 2015
at the Ministerial Conference held in December 2013.210 When the issue is
revisited, there are several reasons why the TRIPS Council should
recommend that TRIPS-related non-violation complaints be allowed in the
limited circumstance of economic cyber espionage.211
For one, non-violation complaints are designed to handle trade
disputes and disruptions of precisely the type posed by economic cyber
espionage. Consider the text of Article XXIII. A member state that is a
victim of economic cyber espionage of the magnitude described above212
can undoubtedly “consider” that a benefit under the TRIPS Agreement—
namely, the rigorous protection of its intellectual property and trade
secrets—is being “nullified or impaired” by that conduct.213 Such claims
would also be consistent with the purpose of the non-violation complaint,
which was initially envisioned by members to provide a “remedy against
actions that are not inconsistent with [WTO] rights and obligations” but
which actions constitute “measures that comply with the letter of the
agreement, but nevertheless frustrate one of its objectives or undermine
trade commitments contained in the agreement.”214 If economic cyber
espionage may evade censure as a violation of a TRIPS rule merely
because the intellectual property harm occurs outside the violator’s
physical territory, that activity nonetheless frustrates a core objective of the
TRIPS Agreement—to safeguard the “minimum levels of protection that
each government has to give to the intellectual property of fellow WTO
members.”215
208

Legal Basis for a Dispute: Types of Dispute in the TRIPS Agreement, WORLD TRADE ORG.,
http://www.wto.org/English/tratop_E/dispu_e/disp_settlement_cbt_e/c4s5p1_e.htm (last visited Apr.
15, 2014).
209
See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 164, art. 64.2 (outlining a five year moratorium); see also
TRIPS: Non-Violation Complaints, supra note 204 (“[F]or the time being, members have agreed not to
use [non-violation complaints] under the TRIPS Agreement.”).
210
Ministerial Decision of 7 December 2013, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://wto.org/english/thewto
_e/minist_e/mc9_e/desci31_e.htm (last visited Apr. 15, 2014).
211
In past discussions, the TRIPS Council considered four options: “(1) banning non-violation
complaints in TRIPS completely, (2) allowing the complaints to be handled under the WTO’s dispute
settlement rules as applied to goods and services cases, (3) allowing non-violation complaints but
subject to special ‘modalities’ (i.e., ways of dealing with them), and (4) extending the moratorium.”
TRIPS: Non-Violation Complaints, supra note 204.
212
See supra Part I.
213
GATT, supra note 206, art. XXIII.
214
Legal Basis for a Dispute: Types of Complaints and Required Allegations in GATT 1994,
WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/disp_settlement_cbt_e/c4s2p2_e.ht
m (last visited Apr. 15, 2014) [hereinafter Legal Basis for a Dispute: Types of Complaints].
215
WTO IP Protection and Enforcement, supra note 160.
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Moreover, given the rigorous requirements for asserting a nonviolation complaint,216 there is little reason to fear that allowing a limited
exception to the moratorium for complaints of economic cyber espionage
would open up a Pandora’s Box of attempted claims. Article 26.1 of the
DSU requires the complainant in a non-violation case to “present a detailed
justification in support of any complaint relating to a measure which does
not conflict with the relevant covered agreement;”217 this complaint must
satisfy the criteria set out in Article XXIII.218
The United States’ hypothetical claim against China is instructive. Per
the doctrine of state responsibility, there appears to be circumstantial (if
not direct) evidence of China’s knowledge and overall control219 of certain
cyber espionage measures taken against the United States’ intellectual
property interests.220 With respect to a relevant right or “benefit accruing”
under the TRIPS Agreement, the United States could argue that it has a
legitimate expectation to every possible market opportunity flowing from
any innovation or industrial design originating in its private sector.221 That
benefit is “nullified or impaired” when economic cyber espionage “has the
effect of upsetting the competitive relationship” of the parties.222 Lastly,
the United States might claim that it “was not able to reasonably anticipate
the application of [economic cyber espionage] when it was negotiating”
216
See generally GATT, supra note 206, art. XXIII (outlining the requisite procedures for making
a non-violation complaint). The requirements can be summarized as follows:

The text of Article XXIII:1(b), combined with the concept of nullification or
impairment of a benefit gives rise to three conditions whose existence a complainant
must establish, in order to be successful with a non-violation complaint. These three
conditions are: (1) the application of a measure by a Member of the WTO; (2) the
existence of a benefit accruing under the applicable agreement; and (3) the
nullification or impairment of a benefit as a result of the application of the measure.
Legal Basis for a Dispute: Types of Complaints, supra note 214.
217
DSU, supra note 187, art. 26.1(a).
218
See supra note 216.
219
As Fidler points out, “Even if a WTO member could construct a claim that economic cyber
espionage violates a WTO rule, it would have to establish that another WTO member’s government is
responsible for the infringing acts.” Fidler, supra note 77, at 3.
220
See supra notes 8–9, 68 and accompanying text. This is key because “[p]urely private
conduct, taken by itself, would not satisfy this condition. If a government simply tolerates private
restrictive conduct, this also could not be challenged with the non-violation complaint.” Legal Basis
for a Dispute: Types of Complaints, supra note 214. However, “[a] different situation is that where the
government actively supports or encourages such private actions.” Id. The recent criminal indictment
against Chinese military actors alleges a direct link with China, but it remains to be seen whether the
United States will be able to prove this link. Furthermore, in the future, such direct links may not be
provable and thus the ability to prove state responsibility through circumstantial evidence remains
important.
221
Cf. Legal Basis for a Dispute: Types of Complaints, supra note 214 (noting that complaining
parties have been able to point to “the legitimate expectation of improved market access opportunities
resulting from the relevant tariff concessions” as a relevant benefit).
222
Id.
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any aspect of its trade relationship with China.
It would be difficult,
however, for member states to credibly make similar claims in cases of less
serious, low-grade cyber-related trade conduct. Therefore, although largescale economic cyber espionage would meet the criteria for a non-violation
complaint, most other conduct that was simply nettlesome to trade would
not. In this way, non-violation complaints for economic cyber espionage
would remain an “exceptional remedy.”224
The possibility of violation or non-violation complaints under TRIPS
makes the WTO an appropriate legal framework for asserting claims
against members that engage in economic cyber espionage. The next
Section argues why the WTO is also the most effective multilateral
institution to manage this process. Although the Article uses the case of
China as an example, the point remains equally true with respect to other
states that have conducted economic cyber espionage in the current
normative and institutional fogginess that exists in international law and
may be driven by similar strategic needs for domestic economic expansion
and global economic integration.
B. The WTO as a Credible Source of Power and Authority225
As conceptualized above, the WTO treaty-based framework is
designed to protect intellectual property and trade secrets. This framework
is compatible with and reinforces the norms of economic sovereignty and
non-economic intervention, as well as the principle that states should be
held responsible for the unlawful economic acts that they sponsor. But
equally important to the existence of these norms under international law is
the ability of the WTO to command compliance. This Section argues that
the WTO members should recognize claims asserted for economic cyber
espionage not only because the WTO agreements allow it, but also because
the WTO is the most effective institution to vindicate these rights as a
matter of credibility, power, and authority.226
223

Id.
Id. (quoting Panel Report, Japan—Measures Affecting Consumer Photographic Film and
Paper, ¶ 10.37, WT/DS44/R (Apr. 22, 1998)).
225
I am indebted to Professor Michael Reisman who taught me to think about the policy
dimension of international law along these lines.
226
Other solutions have been proposed. For example, Dennis Blair and John Huntsman have
recommended:
224

[I]mmediately: denying products that contain stolen intellectual property access to
the U.S. market; restricting use of the U.S. financial system to foreign companies
that repeatedly steal intellectual property; and adding the correct, legal handling of
intellectual property to the criteria for both investment in the United States under
Committee for Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) approval and for
foreign companies that are listed on U.S. stock exchanges.
Blair & Huntsman, supra note 6 (emphasis omitted).
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The WTO Has Power and Authority that Aspiring Superpower
States Will Respect

To be effective, rules of law must be backed by the perceived authority
to decide that those rules apply and the power to command compliance.227
There are several reasons why the WTO holds this power and authority
and, as such, is the most effective multilateral institution to decide disputes
over economic cyber espionage.
In the case of China, for example, the WTO is a necessary and critical
element of its rise to superpower status—China’s rise, which is predicated
on economic expansion, depends on the continued embrace of the world
economic community.228 Its inability to participate in the WTO and trade
with its members—especially the United States—would be deleterious to
that goal.229 Although China aspires to “leap from a poor isolated nation to
a global economic superpower,” if it “fails to evolve toward more
responsible behavior both abroad and at home, a backlash that is already
forming in the United States and among its neighbors will swell.”230
Because China needs the WTO’s support, that institution holds real power
over China and stands as a source of authoritative decisionmaking.
The WTO also holds symbolic power and authority over China.231
Participation in this club is an important sign of China’s acceptance by the
world’s most powerful trading states and, by proxy, its own rising
economic status. For these reasons, the WTO’s approbation of economic
cyber espionage would serve to mark such norm or rule as “legally
meaningful and effective.”232
Finally, the WTO is also a credible source of authority. To be
effective, “[l]egal arrangements must also include credible commitments to
apply the resources necessary to make them effective, as the expectation
that there are such commitments and that they will be applied in the event
of deviance from the arrangement is an important factor in compliance.”233
Once WTO members recognize economic cyber espionage as a violation of
227
See REISMAN, supra note 101, at 95–100 (discussing authoritative power as a requirement for
“any effective legal arrangement” in the context of international law and politics).
228
See supra Part II.A (discussing China’s pressures to rise and dependence on integration within
the international economic order).
229
See Karabell, supra note 42 (noting that “[t]housands of Chinese companies depend on the
U.S. market, and on continued exposure to American businesses as they turn to serve a burgeoning
domestic Chinese consumer market”).
230
The China Moment, WASH. POST, June 6, 2013, at A14.
231
See REISMAN, supra note 101, at 77 (“Symbols of authority are a factor that contributes toward
compliance.”).
232
See id. (“Legal communications are distinguished from the daily bombardment of ‘you
shoulds’ and ‘you-oughts’ by the fact that they are accompanied by (i) symbols of authority and (ii)
commitments of control. Together the signals of authority and control serve to mark the
communications they attend as legally meaningful and effective.”).
233
Id.
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the covered agreements, through the application and incorporation of
customary norms, then the full weight of the DSU mechanisms become
available.234 The dispute resolution mechanism—and its ability to require
a violating state to bring its law and policy into conformance—represents a
credible commitment of resources to enforcing a legal proscription against
economic cyber espionage. In fact, with the WTO’s power and authority
looming large, even the threat of a claim against China could go far in
deterring its conduct.235
2. The WTO Presents a Palatable Solution
Efforts to secure compliance and to deter unwanted conduct are also
well-served by presenting a solution that the violator perceives to be in its
interest or, at least, palatable. Providing such a face-saving solution that is
considered acceptable, from an appearances perspective, is often critical in
resolving or mediating a conflict.236 This is especially important where a
party to the conflict faces internal, domestic pressure to maintain a strong
façade or present a successful image.237 China may fit this paradigm. It
faces domestic pressure to sustain its economic progress,238 and would
therefore likely resist cooperation with any rules of law perceived to be
destructive of that image. WTO sanctions could frustrate its citizens’
expectations of improved economic conditions,239 which “would be a
deeply disillusioning experience if China’s government is somehow
implicated.”240
Importantly, the WTO dispute settlement mechanism provides a
palatable solution by which China’s leaders could avoid a difficult tradeoff between compliance with the WTO’s prescriptions and internal
political strength. A canonical principle of the Dispute Settlement Body is
“to settle disputes, not to pass judgment.”241 Accordingly, after it has been
decided that a “country has done something wrong, it should swiftly

234
See WTO IP Protection and Enforcement, supra note 160 (stating that the dispute settlement
system is “available” for “trade disputes over intellectual property rights”).
235
See LEWIS, supra note 3, at 49 (“Even a credible hint that the United States is considering
[going to the WTO] would have an immediate effect on Chinese decisionmaking.”); see also Robert F.
Turner, Cyberdeterrenece, 126 HARV. L. REV. F. 181, 181 (2013) (“[T]he most effective responses will
focus on affecting the perceptions of decisionmakers on the other side.”).
236
See Christina Parajon, War-Stopping Techniques in the Falklands, in STOPPING WARS AND
MAKING PEACE: STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTION 1, 38, 45–46 (Kristen Eichensehr & W.
Michael Reisman eds., 2009) (discussing the importance of politically palatable solutions in warstopping or mediation efforts in the context of the Falklands dispute).
237
See id. at 18 (discussing the Argentine junta’s need to appear strong at home).
238
See supra notes 29–35 and accompanying text.
239
See supra Part II.A.1.
240
Legro, supra note 29, at 525.
241
UNDERSTANDING THE WTO, supra note 158, at 55.

2014]

AN INTERNATIONAL LAW RESPONSE TO ECONOMIC CYBER ESPIONAGE

1207

242

correct its fault.”
Thus, a state deemed to be in violation of the WTO
rules or spirit of agreement is given the chance to develop a means to bring
its policies and laws “into line with the ruling or recommendations.”243
Sanctions—which are punitive in nature and, arguably, viewed by a state
as more shameful—cannot be applied unless the violator refuses to follow
the Panel or Appeal Body’s recommendations after a reasonable period of
time and then fails to agree to compensate the complaining country for that
failure.244 This system would essentially allow a violator state to take
ownership of the problem, without admitting direct malfeasance—albeit
essentially conceding its state responsibility—to remedy the economic
cyber espionage.
V. CONCLUSION
This Article considered the lack of norms and institutional mechanisms
that apply to economic cyber espionage in international law. It argued that
economic cyber espionage is both a breach of well-established customary
norms—as those norms have evolved to provide derivative rights to
economic sovereignty and non-economic intervention—as well as a
violation of WTO rules. The Article then explained why the WTO, as the
anchor of the world economic community, is the most appropriate and
effective forum for asserting claims regarding this conduct. It explained
why the WTO’s treaties and rules should be interpreted through these
customary norms to establish that economic cyber espionage violates both
the letter and the spirit of the TRIPS Agreement. The Article concluded
with some realist perspective on why this institution would be effective in
ensuring compliance: it has the power and authority to decide that
economic cyber espionage violates international law and offers a credible
process for ensuring that these rules will be enforced.
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practical or if it would not be effective, the sanctions can be imposed in a different sector of the same
agreement.”).
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